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Abstract
This chapter describes how economic theory (and experience) of the demand for insurance predicts that
risk-averse individuals purchase coverage if available at so-called fair premiums, which amount to no
more than the expected value of the loss to be covered. In the case of health, additional fi nancial means
(provided by coverage) may be even more important when a person is ill than when he or she is healthy.
If so, demand for health insurance, even in low-income countries, could be high.
Every insurer needs to charge a “loading” for administrative expense, compensation for risk, and profi t
(in the case of a public insurer, the loading amounts to the effi ciency loss caused by taxation needed to
finance the insurer's operations). Therefore, the behavior of health insurance suppliers becomes of
crucial importance. The loading contained in their premiums (or contributions) is just one of several
supply dimensions, which include comprehensiveness of benefits, amount of risk selection effort, degree
of vertical integration with health services providers, and degree of seller concentration in the market.
This chapter addresses these dimensions of supply and the powerful effect on them of moral hazard (the
tendency of consumers to underinvest in prevention, choose the most intensive treatment alternative,
and push for application of the latest medical technology). In the presence of marked moral hazard
effects, health insurers are well advised to include only a few items in their benefi t list, because each of
these items tends to increase in price, quantity, and hence expenditure. Moreover, premium regulation
induces risk selection efforts. If allowed to charge contributions according to true risk, health insurers
will set premiums such that high and low risks yield the same contribution margin on expectation. In
that event, risk selection (“cream skimming”) is not worthwhile. These phenomena hold not only for
private health insurance in low-income countries but also for community-based and public health
insurance.
Because little empirical data on the supply of health insurance exist, case studies, mainly of low-income
countries, are used to illustrate theoretical predictions. On the whole, the limited empirical evidence
suggests that the theory developed in this chapter may be suffi ciently descriptive to provide some
guidelines for policy.
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CHAPTER 3
Supply of Private Voluntary Health Insurance 
in Low-Income Countries
Peter Zweifel, Boris B. Krey, and Maurizio Tagli
T
his chapter describes how economic theory (and experience) of the demand 
for insurance predicts that risk-averse individuals purchase coverage if 
available at so-called fair premiums, which amount to no more than the 
expected value of the loss to be covered. In the case of health, additional fi nan-
cial means (provided by coverage) may be even more important when a person 
is ill than when he or she is healthy. If so, demand for health insurance, even in 
low-income countries, could be high.
Every insurer needs to charge a “loading” for administrative expense, com-
pensation for risk, and profi t (in the case of a public insurer, the loading amounts 
to the effi ciency loss caused by taxation needed to fi nance the insurer’s opera-
tions). Therefore, the behavior of health insurance suppliers becomes of crucial 
importance. The loading contained in their premiums (or contributions) is just 
one of several supply dimensions, which include comprehensiveness of bene-
fi ts, amount of risk selection effort, degree of vertical integration with health 
services providers, and degree of seller concentration in the market. This chap-
ter addresses these dimensions of supply and the powerful effect on them of 
moral hazard (the tendency of consumers to underinvest in prevention, choose 
the most intensive treatment alternative, and push for application of the lat-
est medical technology). In the presence of marked moral hazard effects, health 
insurers are well advised to include only a few items in their benefi t list, because 
each of these items tends to increase in price, quantity, and hence expenditure. 
Moreover, premium regulation induces risk selection efforts. If allowed to charge 
contributions according to true risk, health insurers will set premiums such that 
high and low risks yield the same contribution margin on expectation. In that 
event, risk selection (“cream skimming”) is not worthwhile. These phenomena 
hold not only for private health insurance in low-income countries but also for 
community-based and public health insurance. 
Because little empirical data on the supply of health insurance exist, case 
studies, mainly of low-income countries, are used to illustrate theoretical pre-
dictions. On the whole, the limited empirical evidence suggests that the theory 
developed in this chapter may be suffi ciently descriptive to provide some guide-
lines for policy. 
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INTRODUCTION
This chapter reviews the extent and the structure of health insurance coverage 
offered by a theoretical private insurer in a competitive, unregulated market. 
However, an attempt is made to qualify the argument when considering the situ-
ation prevailing in developing countries; case studies (where available) are cited 
for support. A specifi c variant considered is community-based (health) insurance 
(CBI), which has some interesting features (Dror and Preker 2002, 2). Through-
out the chapter, private insurance is also compared with public insurance, which 
is defi ned as a compulsory monopolistic insurance scheme operated by a govern-
ment agency. 
The chapter begins with elements of the supply of insurance coverage that can 
be determined or at least infl uenced by the individual insurer in an unregulated 
market and continues with elements that are more related to market processes 
and outcomes. The fi rst element considered is the composition of the benefi ts 
package. In principle, the broader the package, the greater the opportunities for 
risk diversifi cation. However, this argument needs to be qualifi ed in the case of 
both low-income countries (LICs) and CBI. Insurers can use the design of insur-
ance policies as an instrument of risk selection (Rothschild and Stiglitz 1976); 
policy makers the world over view cream skimming as a major concern. The next 
element is the loading, or the price of health insurance. It should be noted that 
gross premium has no infl uence on supply, because the component that equals 
expected loss is paid out to the insured. Loading contributes to cost recovery 
and expected profi t. The next element is vertical integration (distinguished from 
vertical integration with vertical restraints), the degree of which infl uences the 
nature and scope of products supplied. Variants of managed care are prominent 
examples of vertical integration in health insurance. The fi nal element consid-
ered is the degree of concentration prevailing in the market. This degree refl ects 
insurers’ decisions but also is infl uenced by antitrust legislation and enforce-
ment. In all of these considerations, the roles of the legal environment and the 
institutional environment are taken into account (annexes 3A and 3B). 
BENEFIT PACKAGE
An unregulated private insurer has the option to specify its offer along three 
dimensions (Zweifel and Breyer 1997, 159). First, it can decide to cover only cer-
tain types of services, for instance, inpatient care but not outpatient care like the 
community health fund in Tanzania (Musau 1999). Second, it can differentiate its 
offer by covering or excluding services offered by certain provider categories, for 
instance, include only physicians registered with a public agency. Third, it may 
determine the amount of the benefi ts paid in case of sickness. The compensation 
may state a certain quantity of services, the compensation per unit of consump-
tion, or the limit up to which expenditures are refunded (see fi gure 3.1). 
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Possible combinations of type of service, type of provider, and amount of ben-
efi ts create opportunities for product innovation and the building of profi table 
market segments. The optimal choice is infl uenced by several factors listed in 
table 3.1, which are discussed starting with the insurer’s point of view and mov-
ing toward demand-side considerations and regulatory and institutional factors 
that affect the insurer’s decision making.
Risk Aversion of Insurer
The relevance of risk aversion for the behavior of insurers has been the subject of 
continued debate (Greenwald and Stiglitz 1990; Chen, Steiner, and White 2001). 
In industrial countries, owners of insurance companies can be assumed to hold 
fully diversifi ed portfolios. As such, they are exposed only to nondiversifi able 
risk, which is refl ected in the company’s β (the slope of the regression linking the 
company’s expected rate of return to the expected rate of return on the capital 
market at large). Therefore, diversifi cation is only in the interest of shareholders 
to the extent that it lowers the company’s (positive) value of β. Management, 
being much less diversifi ed in its assets, has an interest in diversifi cation of its 
own. Therefore, the extent to which it actually engages in diversifi cation of the 
underwriting portfolio is a question of corporate governance. 
Assuming that risk aversion raises interest in risk diversifi cation, its impact on 
the benefi t package can go either way. To the extent that inpatient services and 
outpatient services constitute complements rather than substitutes, they are pos-
itively correlated. Including both in the benefi ts package increases the variance 
of liabilities ceteris paribus (all other factors being equal), which runs counter to 
the interests of a risk-averse insurer. Benefi ts triggered by communicable diseases 
have the same effect, motivating the benefi ts’ strict limitation. Even if the corre-
lation is negative, risk diversifi cation does not necessarily imply more complete 
FIGURE 3.1  Differentiation of Benefi ts
Source: Authors.
type of service
type of provideramount of benefits
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benefi t packages at the individual level, because the insurer can offer different 
packages to different client groups. 
To the extent that domestic investors in LICs cannot rely on a suffi ciently 
developed capital market (or are prevented from achieving full international 
diversifi cation), their risk aversion is more likely to be relevant for management 
decisions. Management, fi nding itself in a similar situation, will tend to further 
reinforce this tendency (assuming corporate governance is as imperfect as in 
industrial countries). 
In CBI schemes, which amount to mutual insurance schemes, owners are indi-
viduals and households with little asset diversifi cation. These schemes have an 
even keener interest in diversifi cation. However, the low income of CBI enrollees 
may force most CBI schemes to stick to narrowly defi ned products in spite of a 
basic need for diversifi cation (Musau 1999). Moreover, in the presence of imper-
fect capital markets, borrowing opportunities for CBI schemes are limited, giving 
rise to liquidity constraints to diversifi cation.
A public health insurance agency is unlikely to be signifi cantly risk averse 
with respect to its fi nancial results. Its opportunities to shift fi nancial risk to the 
government, which can resort to printing money if necessary, and responsibility 
for failure are numerous. Therefore, risk aversion cannot have much importance 
in determining the benefi t package.
Synergies among Benefi ts
Synergies denote economies of scope in production, distribution, and marketing 
that are unrelated to risk diversifi cation effects. They cause insurers to benefi t 
from the offer of multiple benefi ts rather than a single benefi t. In production, 
synergies arise when the costs of writing and executing contracts (specifi cally 
the processing of losses, compare the term µ × pi in equation (3.1) on page 69) 
do not rise proportionally with the number of benefi ts, resulting in decreasing 
expected unit cost. In distribution, the same channel may be used to sell addi-
tional products. In marketing, brand advertising benefi ts all the products that a 
given insurer sells.
Synergy effects can be as strong as in LICs as in industrial countries. To the 
extent that private health insurers in LICs seek to maximize profi ts, they want 
to make full use of economies of scope. For instance, Fedsure Holdings, a South 
African insurance company, was able to decrease unit costs by cooperating with 
Norwich Holdings, a medical scheme administrator and private hospital owner. 
This alliance enabled Fedsure to make its medical benefi t package more compre-
hensive (McGregor and others 1998).
Synergy effects typically are limited for CBI schemes, which often lack the 
capacity to jointly administer several insurance products. The scarcity of health 
care providers in their area of operation also means that opportunities for com-
bining services are limited. Moreover, CBI schemes sometimes rely on barter, and 
the goods offered in exchange for services may not accord with the preferences 
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of a great variety of providers (Tenkorang 2001). For example, the Mburahati 
Health Trust Fund in Tanzania only offers a limited benefi t package of outpa-
tient care, along with a cost reimbursement of 10 percent for treatment in public 
hospitals. Chronic diseases, HIV/AIDS, and tuberculosis are not covered (Musau 
1999). In general, scope for synergy effects appears to lie with cooperation among 
CBI schemes. However, this cooperation would result in larger pools, which tend 
to worsen moral hazard problems. 
In a public insurance system, synergies are not very relevant criteria for a pub-
lic decision maker who aims at providing public and merit goods to the popula-
tion. This objective tends to override the economic justifi cation of extending 
benefi ts purely because of synergies. 
Moral Hazard
The effect of ex post moral hazard (defi ned below) on the benefi t package can be 
illustrated as follows. Assume that consumers’ willingness to pay out of pocket 
for a medical service or product is approximately given by the linear demand 
function C′C of fi gure 3.2. In the case of health insurance with a 50 percent coin-
surance rate, maximum willingness to pay is doubled, from C′ to C″. More gen-
erally, the demand function is rotated outward to become the effective demand 
function CC″. The lower the rate of coinsurance, the more pronounced this rota-
tion. With no copayment (as is often the case with tax-funded schemes), the 
curve runs fully vertical from C.
Therefore, the market equilibrium shifts from point E to F; a higher quantity 
of the service or product is transacted. In terms of equation (3.2) on page 69, the 
benefi ts to be paid in the event of illness (I) increase, resulting in an ex post moral 
TABLE 3.1  Factors Affecting the Size of the Benefi t Package
Factor
Private insurance 
(competitive 
market)
Private insurance 
(in LICs)
Community- based 
insurance
Public insurance 
(in LICs)
Risk aversion of insurer +/– +/–    ↑ +/–    ↓ n.a.
Synergies among benefi ts + + +    ↓ n.a.
Moral hazard – –    ↓ –    ↓ –    ↑
Diversity of preferences + +    ↓ +    ↓ +    ↓
Diversity of risks + +    ↓ +    ↓ +    ↓
Emergence of new health risks + +    ↓ +    ↓ +    ↑
Regulation + + + +    ↑
Fraud and abuse – – –    ↑ –    ↓
Source: Authors.
Note: LICs = low-income countries; n.a. = not applicable. A plus sign means the factor increases the benefi ts package; a minus 
sign means it decreases the package. An upward-pointing arrow indicates reinforcement of relationship; a downward-pointing 
arrow indicates attenuation of relationship.
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hazard effect. As will be argued below, a decrease in the rate of coinsurance causes 
both parts of the loading and, hence, the premium to increase, creating a negative 
income effect (shifting the demand curve inward) that is neglected for simplicity.
The moral hazard effect is relevant to the choice of benefi t package, because it 
comes to bear with each additional item in the package. The more complete the 
package, the larger the loading component in the gross premium and, hence, 
the larger the net cost of insurance. Therefore, moral hazard considerations 
should lead an insurer to exercise caution in expanding the package. Specifi cally, 
it would want to add services characterized by low price elasticity of demand, 
because the moral hazard effect is more limited in this case. In fi gure 3.2, lower 
price elasticity means that for a given maximum willingness to pay such as C′, 
the demand function runs steeper, causing point C to shift toward the origin. 
This shift serves to reduce the difference between the true and the observed 
demand curve and, hence, the size of the ex post moral hazard effect.
Ahuja and Jütting (2003, 13) argue that ex post moral hazard is less of a prob-
lem in LICs, mainly because density of supply remains low, causing nonmon-
etary costs of utilization to weigh heavily. The following example may illustrate 
their argument. Suppose that the total cost of using medical care in an LIC is 
100, of which 50 is the monetary price of the visit and 50 is the cost of travel, 
FIGURE 3.2  Ex Post Moral Hazard
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accommodation, and lost income. With full coverage, this total cost falls to 50, 
or by one-half. By way of contrast, in an industrial country, the total cost may 
be 500. However, because of income replacement, the only cost is cost of travel 
to the insured, amounting to 100. Even this cost is relatively low due to a high 
density of medical supply. If the price of the visit is reimbursed in full, total cost 
falls from 500 to 100, a reduction of 80 percent. Thus, LICs are still characterized 
by barriers to access that limit ex post moral hazard effects, which in principle 
should facilitate expansion of benefi t packages.
Moral hazard may be even less of a problem in CBI schemes, which usually 
consist of small risk pools. First, asymmetric information is less pronounced in a 
small (often rural) community, where each member of the pool can easily moni-
tor the behavior of others. Therefore, any overuse of an extended benefi t pack-
age would be quickly detected. Furthermore, the sanctions meted out by the 
community can be enormous (in the extreme, expulsion from the community) 
and thus constitute an effective device to enforce discipline among the insured. 
The experience of community-based credit schemes is instructive in this regard. 
Failure to pay back a credit may be sanctioned by whipping and even expul-
sion from the community (Hoff and Stiglitz 1993). Ceteris paribus, CBI schemes 
should be less hampered than private insurers by moral hazard considerations 
when making decisions about an expansion of their benefi t package.
In a public insurance system, moral hazard sooner or later becomes an impor-
tant consideration in determination of the benefi t package. Consumption of 
health care services usually entails little or no cost sharing for the user, which 
means that in fi gure 3.2 the vertical observed demand function applies. There-
fore, the public insurer must fi nance the maximum quantity, C, times the unit 
price, CD, for each benefi t added. The public insurer is subject to the ex post 
moral hazard effect to a higher degree than a private insurer, which would offer 
policies with varying degrees of cost sharing. Unless contributions (often levied 
in the guise of a payroll tax) or tax allocations are increased accordingly, the 
scheme ends up in defi cit. 
Diversity of Preferences
Creation of a benefi t package depends on its value to consumers. Consumers 
will demand a package that combines benefi ts to the extent that their marginal 
rate of substitution is equal on expectation. A unit of benefi t will be added to the 
package until its ratio of expected marginal utility to the premium increase occa-
sioned is equal across all benefi ts. This expected value depends on the amount of 
risk aversion and the relevant probabilities of loss. Differences in loss probabili-
ties are addressed in “Diversity of Risks.”
Diversity of preferences among the insured causes their optimality conditions 
to be satisfi ed at different (sometimes zero) levels of benefi ts. To attract consum-
ers, insurers will customize their products in an attempt to maximize expected 
profi t. The diversity of preferences may relate to the amount of the deductible, 
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the rate of coinsurance, and the limits on benefi ts, as well as type of service 
(for instance, alternative medicine) and type of provider. In this way, permanent 
innovation and adjustment to changing demand occur. As a general rule, prod-
uct differentiation is costly. 
Consumers at low levels of income and wealth are less willing and able to 
bear this cost. For this reason, the relationship between diversity of preferences 
and size and structure of benefi t packages likely is attenuated in LICs, both for 
private and CBI schemes. This reasoning also holds for a public health insurer 
operating in a LIC.
Diversity of Risks
Diversity of risks (in the sense of differences in loss probabilities) promotes a dif-
ferentiation of degrees of coverage, combined with a differentiation of premiums. 
If insurers are unable to assess risks, a differentiation of premiums cannot occur, 
which encourages the purchase of excess coverage by high risks and reduced cov-
erage by low risks. Therefore, the insurer runs the danger of incurring a defi cit 
when expanding the benefi t package. The same argument holds when the insurer 
is prevented from differentiating premiums by a mandate to take on every appli-
cant on the same conditions. When combined with asymmetric information, 
diversity of risks thus hampers creation of comprehensive benefi t packages.
This argument appears to be relevant for LICs as well. ISAPRE, a private health 
insurance group in Chile, has been offering fair comprehensive benefi t pack-
ages while avoiding defi cits. However, it has the right to form homogeneous risk 
groups, which are charged differentiated, risk-based premiums. Such premiums 
make coverage too expensive for the poor and large subsets of the elderly (Hoh-
mann and Holst 2002). In Indonesia, where premium differentiation is more 
limited, most private health insurers greatly reduce benefi ts offered to people 
aged 55 and older (Hohmann, Lankers, and Schmidt-Ehry 2002).
CBI schemes typically provide uniform coverage to all participants at a uni-
form premium. According to the argument advanced above, this coverage should 
cause the schemes to opt for small benefi t packages. This prediction is borne 
out in the case of the Kisiizi and Chogoria insurance schemes in Kenya, which 
exclude HIV/AIDS treatment, eyeglasses, self-infl icted injuries, and dental care 
(Musau 1999, 10). Of course, other reasons may be responsible for the limited 
size of the benefi t package in this country and other LICs.
For a public health insurer, uniformity of benefi ts is part of its mission, 
because it acts on behalf of the government, whose likely objective is to pro-
vide citizens with a maximum of public and so-called merit goods. By assump-
tion, public goods are enjoyed by everyone to the same degree; therefore, if the 
government views access to health care as a public good, its insurance branch 
must act accordingly, guaranteeing equal access through equal benefi ts. Diver-
sity of risks can hardly be refl ected in a diversity of (planned) benefi ts under 
these circumstances.
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Emergence of New Health Risks
New health risks increase demand for extension of the benefi t package. How-
ever, even under competitive conditions, insurers will not immediately adjust to 
this demand. First, they need time to assess the probability of loss pi. Second, an 
extension of the benefi t package calls for a premium adjustment, which in turn 
usually requires a cancellation of the policy. It takes new business to provide 
the insurer with the opportunity to test consumers’ willingness to pay a higher 
premium for the added benefi t. Even under competitive conditions, new health 
risks will thus be covered only with a certain delay.
With regard to LICs, the expected cost of treating a new disease is crucial. 
Although coverage of costly new diseases increases a consumer’s willingness to 
pay, the necessary premium adjustment may result in an amount exceeding the 
consumer’s income. Moreover, in LICs some of the new risks will be communi-
cable diseases, which cause individual illness probabilities to be positively cor-
related. Extending the benefi t package may increase the risk of ruin. This latter 
argument carries even more weight for CBI schemes, because they operate in 
areas where close personal contact is common (Nugroho, Macagba, and Dorros 
2001). A public insurer is called on to cover emerging new risks, because public 
health is at stake. Although hardly concerned by the risk of ruin, the insurer still 
must take into account that the government might have to cover high defi cits. 
Regulation
Premium regulation typically concerns not only premiums but also products, 
because it can be subverted by product differentiation. Premium regulation typi-
cally prevents insurers from differentiating premiums according to true risk. A 
given uniform premium is associated with a contribution to expected profi t in 
the case of a low risk but is the cause of an expected defi cit in the case of a high 
risk. Therefore, an insurer must attract as many low risks as possible. One way to 
do so is to modify the benefi t package, excluding services that attract high risks. 
More generally, insurers will use benefi ts to compete with differentiated prod-
ucts, because the regulator hinders price competition. In principle, premium 
regulation increases the variety of benefi t packages in the market, unless product 
regulation neutralizes this tendency. 
Overall, regulation of insurance can reduce effi ciency, particularly if it seeks 
to minimize the social cost of insolvency by avoiding insolvency altogether (see 
annex 3A and table 3A.1). Typically this type of regulation limits itself to miti-
gating the social costs of insolvencies, while permitting them in principle (see 
table 3A.2). 
A country with little regulation of private health insurance is Croatia, and 
the choice of insurance products there is indeed very wide (World Bank 2003, 
19). However, the benefi t package may also include coverage of the copayment 
imposed by the public insurance scheme, which exposes the scheme to moral 
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hazard of the ex post type and thus causes the true price of public health insur-
ance to increase. In addition, the danger of cartelistic agreements is consider-
able, because two insurers, one of which is even government owned, dominate 
the market.
The extent to which LICs regulate premiums and products differs greatly. 
Some private insurers, such as those in Singapore and Taiwan (China), face strict 
regulations with regard to both premiums and products (for an overview of the 
different national regulatory systems, see table 3A.3). By way of contrast, insur-
ers in countries such as Chile and Thailand have more autonomy in setting their 
premiums, and their benefi t packages are more varied. 
In most CBI schemes, members determine the premium, and the resulting 
premium is uniform. The schemes undertake little risk selection effort through 
product differentiation, because the risk pool is homogeneous. Moreover, most 
CBI schemes are local monopolies; therefore, they have little incentive to com-
pete for members with differentiated benefi t packages. An example is the Mbura-
hati Health Trust Fund in Tanzania (Musau 1999), which offers only coverage for 
outpatient care and a small contribution toward public hospital care.
Because public health insurance is subject to a maximum degree of regulation, 
its benefi t package is more strongly determined by regulation than the benefi t 
package of private and CBI schemes. Expanding benefi ts is the aim of a govern-
ment that seeks to provide a maximum amount of public goods; therefore, a 
strong tendency in this direction can be expected.
Fraud and Abuse
Fraud and abuse may occur at three levels. First, it constitutes an extreme form 
of moral hazard on the part of the insured, which the insurer can counter with 
inspections and curtailment or even denial of benefi ts. Second, providers of 
services may act fraudulently; here the countermeasure is to pattern their remu-
neration so as to give them an incentive for honesty (revelation principle, see 
for example, Laffont and Tirole 1993, chapter 1). Third, fraud and abuse may 
occur when health care providers make their purchase. The insurer cannot eas-
ily neutralize this type of fraud and abuse unless competition among providers 
is strong. 
In LICs, generally weak institutions foster corruption, which may affect the 
quality and quantity of benefi t packages. According to international corruption 
indexes, such as the annually published Transparency International Bribe Payers 
and Corruption Perception Indices, unfair market behavior is much more com-
mon in developing countries than in countries in the Organisation for Economic 
Co-operation and Development (OECD) (Transparency International, several 
years). China, the Russian Federation, and Taiwan (China) scored particularly 
poorly in both indexes in 2002 (see annex 3B). 
Providers of medical supplies may ex ante defraud physicians and hospitals 
by offering money payments for use of their more expensive products rather 
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than cheaper products from competing suppliers. The former products tend to 
be of lower quality and quantity, because corrupt suppliers have to recover their 
bribery payments through their sales margins. The result is that insurable medi-
cal services are of lower quality at a given price. An insurer considering exten-
sion of its benefi ts package thus has to take into account that an additional 
benefi t may well be of lower quality and thus induce little willingness to pay in 
terms of higher premiums, which makes more-comprehensive benefi t packages 
unattractive. For instance, some private health insurers in Thailand decided to 
terminate coverage for ambulatory care, because auditing the bills and checking 
for fraud became too costly (Health Systems Research Institute 2002, 7). 
CBI schemes have minimum administrative capacity, suggesting that they 
have limited capability to monitor the behavior of health care providers. There-
fore, they may run an even greater risk than private health insurers of purchas-
ing services of low quality when extending their benefi t package. This risk forces 
them to build their package on those (possibly few) services the purchase of 
which is little infected by corruption.
In principle, corruption affects a public health insurer in the same way as a 
private one: the former can offer only fewer services or lower-quality services for 
the amount of payroll tax or general tax received—thus its benefi t package is not 
as comprehensive as it could be. The public health insurer cannot easily purge 
from its benefi ts those items whose suppliers are corrupt. Therefore, the negative 
relationship between benefi ts and fraud is attenuated, at least as long as incur-
ring a defi cit is an option.
RISK SELECTION EFFORT
Most policy makers and even many economists believe that “skimming the 
cream,” that is, making an effort to attract favorable risks, is typical of private 
health insurers. However, on closer examination, this belief is unjustifi ed. If 
health insurers were entirely free to grade their premiums according to risk, they 
would not want to invest in risk selection, because an unfavorable risk would be 
charged a high premium, whereas a favorable risk would demand and obtain a 
low premium. Given expected future health care cost, insurers would adjust pre-
miums to equalize the expected contribution margin across risk groups. Under 
the pressure of competition, they simply cannot cross-subsidize one risk group 
to the detriment of another, because the discriminated group can generate a 
more favorable offer from a competing insurer (see Zweifel 2005 for a quantita-
tive formulation). For this reason, “not applicable” is entered in table 3.2 where 
appropriate to refl ect the fully competitive unregulated benchmark, indicating 
that the factor considered is ineffective. In the following discussion, however, 
the assumption is that premiums are regulated at least to some extent, imposing 
more uniformity than warranted in view of actuarial considerations and induc-
ing competitive insurers’ interest in risk selection.
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Risk Aversion of Insurer
If premiums have to differ from the expected value of the loss covered plus load-
ing (see equation (3.1) on page 69), the insurer’s underwriting result has excessive 
variance. The predicted response of management to this increased risk exposure 
depends on the same considerations noted above. If management has leeway 
to pursue its own interests, inducing risk-averse behavior, it will undertake risk 
selection efforts because it can decrease its own risk exposure in this way (see 
table 3.2). This response is probably particularly marked in those LICs imposing 
premium regulation, because in the interest of simplicity, this regulation tends 
toward uniform premiums (rather than moderation of excessive premium dif-
ferentiation or neutralization of incentives for risk selection by implementation 
of a more or less elaborate risk-adjustment scheme; see, for example, van de Ven 
and Ellis 2000). CBIs also tend to undertake risk selection, because their member-
owners are much less diversifi ed than the typical shareholders of an insurance 
company and thus are particularly concerned about excess exposure to a risk that 
may ultimately spell insolvency. For a public insurer that wields a monopoly, risk 
selection is irrelevant, hence the “not applicable” entries in table 3.2.
Moral Hazard
A competitive health insurer would want to charge a high premium to consumers 
who are particularly susceptible to moral hazard (see equation (3.3) on page 74). 
If premium regulation would make doing so impossible, risk selection is a sub-
stitute measure, because it can be used to keep the high-moral-hazard types out 
of the insured population. However, as long as nonmonetary barriers to utiliza-
TABLE 3.2  Factors Affecting Risk Selection Effort
Factor
Private insurance 
(competitive market)
Private insurance 
(in LICs)
Community- based 
insurance
Public insurance 
(in LICs)
Risk aversion of insurer + (n.a.) +    ↑ +    ↑ n.a.
Moral hazard + (n.a.) +    ↓ +    ↓ n.a.
Size of the benefi t package + (n.a.) + +    ↑ n.a.
Diversity of risks + (n.a.) + +    ↓ n.a.
Access to risk information + (n.a.) +    ↓ +    ↓ n.a.
Sellers’ concentration – (n.a.) – –    ↑ n.a.
Regulation + (n.a.) + + n.a.
Source: Authors.
Note: LICs = low-income countries; n.a. = not applicable. A plus sign means the factor increases risk selection efforts; a minus 
sign means it decreases these efforts. An upward-pointing arrow indicates reinforcement of relationship; a downward-pointing 
arrow indicates attenuation of relationship.
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tion of health care services are high in LICs, moral hazard effects and hence the 
incentive to engage in risk selection are mitigated in LICs. The same argument in 
combination with social control mechanisms applies to CBI schemes.
Size of Benefi t Package
With a very limited benefi t package, differences in the expected contribution 
margins of the high-risk insured and those of the low-risk insured typically are 
not that large. Therefore, the incentive to engage in risk selection is not very 
marked either (Zweifel 2005). Conversely, the more comprehensive the benefi t 
package, the more health insurers are predicted to invest in risk selection efforts. 
This tendency is probably especially strong among CBI schemes, because once 
they begin to offer more benefi ts, their risk exposure increases, and so a more 
careful selection of risks acts as a counterbalance.
Diversity of Risks
Above all, diversity of risks means that the insured differ widely in terms of their 
expected value of loss, that is, their probability of illness, use of medical care 
in the event of illness, or both. The larger such diversity, the more premium 
regulation (in the limit, uniformity of premiums) induces excess variance in the 
underwriting result. A private health insurer is predicted to counter this variance 
by stepping up its risk selection effort. However, the same behavior is predicted 
for a CBI scheme (or in fact any nonprofi t insurer) as long as running into defi cit 
triggers a sanction of some sort (Zweifel 2005). In the case of CBIs, this tendency 
is weaker, because traditionally their insured population has always been very 
homogeneous.
Access to Risk Information
Risk selection is an attempt on the part of the health insurer to at least partially 
overcome an asymmetry of information resulting from the likely fact that the 
person to be enrolled knows more about his or her future health risks than does 
the insurer. However, genetic information may change that asymmetry. In fact, 
the availability of such information permits the insurer to predict the future 
health care expenditure of an individual with much greater precision. More-
over, refusal to provide genetic information suggests that the person has genetic 
information at his or her disposal, indicating he or she constitutes a high risk. 
Therefore, improved access to risk information of this type greatly enhances the 
effectiveness of risk selection efforts. Accordingly, risk selection becomes a more 
attractive alternative for health insurers. The limiting factor in the case of most 
LCIs is that this information may be more costly to obtain in LICs than in indus-
trial countries.
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Sellers’ Concentration
Wilson (1977) illustrates the importance of sellers’ concentration with the follow-
ing thought experiment. If only two companies (A and B) were in the market, risk 
selection would not make much sense, provided the two competitors’ planning 
horizon extended beyond the current period. In period 1, insurer A may be able 
to fi lter out the favorable risks. However, it would dump these risks on insurer 
B, which in turn would resort to risk selection in period 2. Thus, in period 3, the 
unfavorable risks would again seek coverage with insurer A. In the end, both A 
and B would lose from investing in risk selection. This consideration makes risk 
selection less likely in concentrated health insurance markets than in unconcen-
trated markets. However, the consideration may apply to CBI schemes to a lesser 
degree, because their insured also own the schemes, fully exposing them to the 
risk of insolvency that may result from failure to carefully gauge potential clients.
Regulation
As noted above, a health insurer with the freedom to grade its premiums accord-
ing to risk will tend to equalize expected contribution margins across risks. High 
risks, although expected to cause high health care expenditures, also pay a high 
premium, whereas low risks must be attracted by low premiums that refl ect their 
low future cost. Arguably, premium regulation, by seeking to relieve the high 
risks of “excessive” premiums, induces risk selection (Pauly 1984). Chapter 4 
proposes a means-tested subsidy paid to potential purchasers of health insurance 
with low incomes to avoid this counterproductive side effect of premium regula-
tion, which is also to be expected in LICs, regardless of for-profi t status. 
LOADING
Private insurers pay an indemnity I to cover a loss against a premium. The gross 
premium can be divided in a net premium (pi × I), with probability of loss pi 
depending negatively on preventive effort on the one hand and loading on the 
other. The net premium covers the expected amount of benefi t to be paid. The 
loading can be further divided into two components. One is a per unit amount 
µ associated with claims processing. The higher the likelihood of presentation of 
a claim, the more often an administrative process is triggered. The other com-
ponent is a multiple λ of expected benefi ts net of copayment (symbolized by a 
rate of coinsurance, c for simplicity), refl ecting acquisition cost, a risk premium, 
and profi t. Therefore, a viable insurance contract must be priced to contain the 
following elements (Zweifel and Breyer 1997, chapter 6.2):
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(3.1) P (I) = net premium + loading 
 =  pi(V) × (1 – c) × I  + µ × pi(V) + λ × pi(V) × (1 – c) × I,
where
P = premium
µ = loading factor for variable administrative costs
pi = loss probability, probability of illness [0 < pi < 1, pi’(V) < 0]
V = preventive effort (unobservable)
c = rate of coinsurance (c < 1)
λ = loading factor for acquisition cost, risk premium, and profi t
I = benefi t paid in the event of illness.
The more complete the coverage, denoted by I, the weaker in general are the 
insured’s incentives for prevention V.1 Taking into account this ex ante moral 
hazard effect, the amount of loading can be written as
(3.2) amount of loading = µ × pi[V(I)] + λ × (1 – c) × pi[V(I)] × I.
The question immediately arising is whether the concept of loading has any 
relevance to a public health insurer. It does. First, a public scheme has admin-
istrative expenses, which rise as the frequency of claims pi increases. As is the 
case with private insurers, this frequency depends on preventive effort V, which 
is again negatively related to coverage I (the ex ante moral hazard effect). The 
term µ × pi[V(I)] of equation (3.2) therefore applies to public insurance. Second, 
although a public insurer need not charge for acquisition cost, risk bearing, 
and profi t, it gives rise to a “loading” similar to the second term of equation 
(3.2). The larger the expected value of benefi ts to be paid net of coinsurance 
[(1 – c) × pi × I], the higher must be the rate of tax levied on labor income or 
on sales. Taxes cause ineffi ciencies, because they reduce the volume of transac-
tions; some contracts that would have been mutually benefi cial are not struck 
because of tax. These ineffi ciencies easily amount to 20 percent of transaction 
value (see, for example, McMaster 2001) and thus comparable in magnitude to 
λ in equation (3.2).
The expression for the loading given by equation (3.2) can also be applied to 
public health insurance, at least to a fi rst approximation. The “loading” may dif-
fer, depending on the type of taxation used to fund the scheme. The income tax 
base is very weak in developing countries (for example, Sierra Leone, Uganda, 
and Zambia), where only a few workers receive formal pay, which could be taxed, 
and most workers are employed in the informal sector. A consumption tax is the 
preferred form of fi nancing for public insurance in many LICs, and because its 
levy is not so costly, it may even decrease loading. The amount of loading is 
infl uenced by several factors listed in table 3.3.
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Administrative Expenses
Administrative expenses must be recovered before the insurer breaks even. They 
are added to the expected loss. The loading factors µ and  λ refl ect these expenses 
and thus determine the amount of loading (see equation (3.2)). They depend 
on possible economies of scale, implying that a certain number of contracts and 
transactions may be necessary to reach minimum average cost. The loading fac-
tors also include capital utilization costs and surcharges for uncertainty about 
future cost infl ation in the health care sector and about the loss probability pi.
Administrative capacity differs widely among developing countries, refl ecting 
differences in labor productivity. However, wage costs are an important compo-
nent of administrative expenses. Because wage rates and labor productivities are 
highly correlated, their combined effect on µ and  λ is undetermined. Therefore, 
whether these loading factors are higher or lower in LICs compared with industrial 
countries and whether they differ systematically among LICs are unclear.
CBI schemes are known for their low administrative expenses, because they 
do not employ many people, and most staff members are volunteers (Nugroho, 
Macagba, and Dorros 2001). Low administrative expenses keep loading factors at 
a low value. In fact, members bear part of the costs of organization by choosing 
the product to be offered and premium to be charged. 
Public health insurance constitutes a monopoly, which means that marketing 
and advertising expenses are reduced. However, a monopoly decreases pressure 
TABLE 3.3  Factors Affecting the Net Price of Health Insurance (Loading)
Factor
Private insurance 
(competitive market)
Private insurance 
(in LICs)
Community-based 
insurance 
Public insurance 
(in LICs)
Administrative expenses, 
including capital charge
+ + +    ↓ +
Reinsurance +/– +/–    ↑ +/–    ↑ n.a.
Pool size +/– +/– +/– –
Benefi t package + + + +
Share of high-income 
members
+/– +/–    ↓ +/–    ↓ +/–
Copayments and caps – – – –    ↓
Moral hazard + +    ↓ +    ↓ +    ↑
Quality and proximity of 
health care services
+ +    ↑ + +
Regulatory framework +/– +/–    ↑ +/–    ↓ +/–    ↑
Fraud and abuse + +    ↑ +    ↓ +    ↑
Source: Authors.
Note: LICs = low-income countries; n.a. = not applicable. A plus sign means the factor increases loading; a minus sign means 
it decreases loading. An upward-pointing arrow indicates reinforcement of relationship; a downward-pointing arrow indicates 
attenuation of relationship.
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to minimize cost. On the whole, the relationship may be comparable to that in 
private competitive health insurance. 
Reinsurance
Generally, reinsurance is an expense that reduces the expected value of profi t 
(if the premium exceeds the actuarial value of losses ceded) (Doherty and Tinic 
1981). Reinsurance is therefore similar to administrative expense, causing load-
ing to increase, ceteris paribus. The benefi t of reinsurance is that it improves the 
solvency of the insurer, permitting a lower value of the loading factor λ. But if 
additional capital is available at lower cost than reinsurance, insurers will fi nd 
reliance on the capital market preferable to taking out reinsurance. 
Interest rates, and thus capital costs, are higher in LICs, because the risk pre-
mium in the credit lending market is high. Consequently, insurers might wish to 
purchase reinsurance rather than raise costly new capital. 
Reinsurance can be benefi cial to CBI schemes, in which pool size usually is 
insuffi cient for the law of large numbers to come into full effect. According to 
this law, insurers are able to estimate pi and hence the expected value of benefi ts 
to be paid more precisely when the number of risks increases. Ceteris paribus, 
this ability facilitates attainment of a given level of solvency. In addition, the 
typically undiversifi ed individual (member) owners of CBI schemes will gain 
from the lower variance of the surplus (assets minus liabilities) generally afforded 
by reinsurance. But this benefi t in terms of variance reduction must be weighed 
against the reinsurance premium. Therefore, low-cost reinsurance may become 
a precondition for the viability of CBI schemes, which usually have no access to 
capital markets. 
Reinsurance will hardly be an issue for a public health insurer. Such an insurer 
has a large risk pool, which allows it to minimize per capita reserves (see discus-
sion below), to which reinsurance contributes. Moreover, the government, as 
lender of last resort, usually provides these reserves; ultimately, taxpayers act as 
reinsurers of the public health insurer. The savings on reinsurance give the pub-
lic monopolist a cost advantage over private insurers. 
Pool Size
A large number of the insured of a similar type allows insurers to estimate the 
unknown parameters pi and I with increased precision. Therefore, insurers do not 
have to carry as many reserves per unit risk to attain a given level of solvency 
(Dror and Preker 2002, 135). The pertinent loading factor λ decreases, resulting 
in a smaller total loading.
However, a large pool size shields the individual insurance buyer from 
social control through other members. This control likely refers to the benefi ts 
claimed (I) rather than to preventive behavior and hence pi. Increased pool 
size thus strengthens ex post moral hazard and lessens ex ante moral hazard. 
72 Peter Zweifel, Boris B. Krey, and Maurizio Tagli
The second term of equation (3.2) increases, indicating that the amount of 
loading increases. 
The same arguments apply to a private insurer operating in an LIC. In the 
case of CBI schemes, the trade-off between the two infl uences can be studied. 
For instance, the Dana Sehat schemes in Indonesia are organized in several thou-
sand independent groups, with approximately 50 to 100 families in each group. 
Families are homogeneous with regard to household size and income, and the 
community environment allows close monitoring of behavior. Although the 
total number of Dana Sehat participants is large (7 million), moral hazard can 
be controlled effectively, resulting in a small loading in spite of small pool size. 
Farmers’ Health Insurance in Taiwan (China) provides a counterexample. There, 
a risk pool typically comprises a few thousand individuals (Bureau of National 
Health Insurance 2003). This small pool could lead to a lower value of λ; however, 
greater pool size also calls for more complex management, and social control is 
undermined. Although information about the total loading is not available, it is 
likely to be higher in Taiwan (China) than in Indonesia. 
Public health insurance schemes have risk pools too large for social control to 
mitigate moral hazard effects. Therefore, expanding these pools unambiguously 
decreases the loading contained in the contribution.   
Benefi t Package
An extension of the benefi t package increases the likelihood of submission of 
claims. Therefore, the probability of loss pi increases even without any behav-
ioral modifi cation on the part of the insured (moral hazard effects are dealt with 
below). Likewise, payment may occur under additional titles, resulting in an 
increased value of payments I. Therefore, the amount of loading must increase 
according to equation (3.2). This argument holds for LICs in general, as well as 
for CBI schemes and public health insurance.
Share of High-Income Members
Two elements promote higher expected consumption of health care services 
by the high-income insured. First, these insured have higher opportunity time 
costs, making prevention (which often is time intensive) more costly and lead-
ing to a higher value of pi, that is, a higher likelihood of illness. Second, because 
medical care is a good—although income elasticity in developed countries has 
been found to be quite low, between 0 and 0.2 (Ringel and others 2002)—the 
high-income insured seek to consume more medical care or medical care of a 
higher quality, increasing the value of I. However, the use of health care usually 
involves taking time from work or household chores. Once more, high-income 
policyholders bear higher opportunity time costs, reducing the quantity (but 
not necessarily the quality) of medical care. This effect is mitigated if supplier 
density is high. 
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On balance, the value of the product pi[V(I)] × I in equation (3.2) is likely to 
increase for a higher share of the high-income insured. However, the share of 
high-income members may also affect the two loading factors. Provided some 
copayment is required, every treatment episode is associated with a risk of collect-
ing receivables. A high-income member triggers less administrative expense on 
this score, thereby lowering the value of µ. An insurer accounting for the fi nancial 
risk will also reduce its safety loading and hence λ. The net effect of a higher share 
of high-income members on the total amount of loading is therefore ambiguous.
The same argument holds for LICs, except when benefi ts are paid in cash 
against presentation of the receipt. This payment eliminates the risk of collecting 
receivables. In that case, high-income members do not give rise to lower load-
ing factors and therefore make a positive impact on total loading more likely. 
With respect to CBI schemes, potential differentiations between high- and low-
income members within a scheme have little relevance, because homogeneous 
groups of similar income join the schemes. 
In contrast with private insurance, a mandatory public scheme can impose 
price discrimination with regard to income, thus making health insurance a 
vehicle for systematic wealth redistribution (see chapter 4 for more detail). 
Individuals with high incomes are therefore charged a loading in the sense 
that their contributions tend to exceed the expected value of benefi ts received. 
In return, the loading charged to the majority of low-income contributors can 
be reduced even to the point of becoming negative. However, this redistribu-
tion strategy may fail if the rich not only pay more but also consume more 
medical services, a scenario not uncommon in LICs (Filmer, Hammer, and 
Pritchett 2002).
Copayments and Caps
Copayments and caps have three effects on total loading. First, they limit ex post 
moral hazard. Copayments increase the net price of medical care to consumers, 
lowering the quantity demanded, while caps increase the net price to its full 
market value when the threshold quantity is exceeded. Therefore, the value of 
payments I decreases on average and with it the amount of loading. In addition, 
caps exclude very high values of I, reducing the (semi-)variance of I and hence 
the loading factor λ.
Second, copayments relieve the insurer of part of the payment in the advent 
of illness. As shown in equation (3.4), an increase in the rate of coinsurance c 
lowers the total amount of loading. Copayments and caps thus unambiguously 
reduce the amount of loading. 
The same arguments hold for LICs and CBI schemes. They have even greater 
force for public health insurance, where the initial rate of copayment is zero, 
resulting in maximum ex post moral hazard effects. Indeed, according to equa-
tion (3.4), the amount of loading reacts most strongly to a variation in the rate 
of coinsurance c when (1 – c) = 1, that is, when c = 0 initially.
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Moral Hazard 
Moral hazard increases the insured’s consumption of health care services and 
thus entails additional costs to the insurer. Ex ante moral hazard refers to the 
probability of illness pi. This probability depends on related preventive effort on 
the part of the insured, denoted by V. Although preventive effort can hardly 
be observed in the context of health behavior, it generally decreases when the 
amount of coverage offered is extended. Ex ante moral hazard thus results in a 
positive relationship between pi and the amount of insurance coverage I.
Indeed, because of ex ante moral hazard, an increase in I is associated with 
not only a higher gross premium but also a higher amount of total loading. For 
convenience, equation (3.2) is repeated here:
(3.2) amount of loading = L = µ × pi[V(I)] + λ × (1 – c) × pi[V(I)] × I.
The derivative of this expression with respect to I (neglecting possible effects of I 
on the loading factors µ and λ) is given by
(3.3) L′(I) = µ × pi′(V) × V′(I) + (1 – c) × λ × pi′(V) × V′(I) × I + λ × (1 – c) × pi[V(I)] > 0.
 (–) (–) (–) (–) (+)
With pi’ and V’ negative, the fi rst term is positive. For the same reason, the sec-
ond term is positive as well, and the third term is positive by defi nition. In anal-
ogy to the development in Zweifel and Breyer (1997, 183), the loading usually 
increases progressively in I, that is, L″(I) > 0 if pi″ > 0 (prevention becoming less 
effective at the margin) in addition to V’(I) < 0.
According to equation (3.3), some health insurance benefi ts may be more 
affected by ex ante moral hazard than others because preventive effort V responds 
more strongly to an increase in I. Conversely, this effect may be mitigated to 
some extent if health insurance is provided through the employer, which can 
at least monitor prevention at the workplace. This difference would be refl ected 
in a more moderate increase in the loading (as well as the gross premium) when 
coverage becomes more complete or more comprehensive.
Summing up, ex ante moral hazard probably causes an increase in the total 
loading, which may even be progressive in benefi ts I. There appear to be no 
strong reasons to modify this argument for private insurers operating in LICs or 
CBI schemes. With regard to public health insurance, the government’s objec-
tive of maximizing the provision of public goods frequently militates against 
imposition of a copayment. However, any increase in benefi ts must go along 
with a maximum increase in the loading because of ex ante moral hazard. In 
equation (3.3), the amount of loading reacts most strongly to an increase in 
benefi ts if (1 – c) = 1, that is, when c = 0.
Ex post moral hazard, as noted above, is the tendency of the insured to 
demand more medical care (or care of a higher quality or by a more expensive 
provider) after the onset of illness. It was illustrated in fi gure 3.2, in which the 
role of coinsurance played a crucial role. 
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To show that a decrease in copayment also increases the amount of loading, 
a slightly different interpretation of the variable I is needed. Now I becomes 
the amount of benefi ts actually claimed (rather than promised in the contract), 
which depends on the rate of coinsurance. Therefore, I must be replaced by I(c) 
in equation (3.2):
(3.4) L′(c) = -λ × pi × I + λ × (1 – c) × pi × I′(c) < 0.
 (–) (–)
Therefore, the higher the rate of coinsurance, the lower the loading, and con-
versely, the lower the rate of coinsurance, the higher must be the loading. The 
ex post moral hazard effect is given by I′(c) < 0: the more the actual utilization 
of covered services increases with a decrease in cost sharing, the more marked is 
the ex post moral hazard effect.  
As argued above, ex post moral hazard is of less concern in LICs, because the 
density of supply is very low, causing nonmonetary costs of utilization to weigh 
heavily. In the context of loading, ex post moral hazard effects in LICs are lim-
ited, resulting in a smaller absolute value of L′(c). 
Ex post moral hazard problems in CBI schemes are of minor concern for the 
same reasons as outlined above. These schemes benefi t from a smaller degree 
of asymmetry of information, as well as effective sanctioning mechanisms that 
contain overuse.
The “loading” contained in the contributions to public health insurance is 
affected strongly by ex post moral hazard, again because the rate of coinsurance 
is usually zero. With (1 – c) = 1 or c = 0, the absolute value of equation (3.4) is 
maximum. Conversely, moving away from a rate of coinsurance would have a 
marked benefi cial effect on the loading. 
Quality and Proximity of Health Care Services
Health care services of high quality have a direct effect on the total loading, 
because the benefi ts actually claimed typically are more expensive (see the effect 
of a high value of I in equation (3.2)). High quality of services may also aggravate 
ex post moral hazard effects, as illustrated by fi gure 3.2. Maximum true willing-
ness to pay for such services must be very high, causing the observed demand 
function to run steeply. In this case, ample insurance coverage (low c) results in a 
marked discrepancy between true and observed willingness to pay. Graphically, 
the distance between quantities A and B becomes larger. In terms of equation 
(3.4), a decrease of the rate of coinsurance c would cause benefi ts claimed to 
increase greatly. With I’(c) large—equivalent to a steep demand function—the 
loading must increase more strongly with a decrease in c. Therefore, the loading 
depends positively on the quality of medical services in general.
Increasing the proximity of services decreases the cost of access and hence the 
total cost of utilizing medical care. Therefore, the amount of services claimed I 
increases, and with it the amount of loading (see equation (3.4)). In addition, 
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as argued above, this reduction of access cost may be greater in LICs than in 
industrial countries, implying that increased proximity of services may boost the 
loading even more in LICs than in industrial countries.
Most members of CBI schemes are located far away from high-quality health 
care service providers. Any increase in the proximity of a health care provider 
therefore is likely to have a considerable effect on the cost of access, inducing a 
particularly marked increase in utilization. However, CBI schemes benefi t from a 
degree of mutual member monitoring that does not prevail in the context of a pri-
vate insurer operating in an LIC. Therefore, in LICs the amount of loading may not 
respond more strongly to an increase in proximity than in industrial countries.
Increased quality and proximity also drive up the loading component in con-
tributions to public health insurance; equation (3.4) applies once more.
Regulatory Framework
The types of regulation of relevance in this context are again premium and prod-
uct regulation. If designed to guarantee solvency, premium regulation typically 
amounts to an increased safety loading, which is refl ected in λ. Conversely, if 
regulation is consumer oriented, it may increase transparency for consumers, 
raise demand, and enlarge the risk pool. Therefore, reserves held per unit risk 
can be reduced, decreasing λ. 
With regard to product regulation, this decrease in reserves implies that certain 
procedures in loss settlement have to be followed, presumably at an increased 
cost to the insurer. These procedures drive up the value of the other loading fac-
tor, µ. Therefore, the overall effect of regulation on the loading is ambiguous, 
although in the case of U.S. automobile regulation, Frech and Samprone (1980) 
found that regulation had a demand-decreasing net effect, pointing to a positive 
relationship between regulation and loading.
The insurance regulatory authorities of many LICs are pressured to relax regula-
tions to satisfy World Trade Organization (WTO) requirements (Lee 2000). China, 
in particular, seeks to increase the degree of competition in its domestic insurance 
market by attracting additional companies. With regard to the type of regulation 
pursued, LIC regulators see few possibilities for insurers to build up deposited 
reserves that could be used to mitigate social cost in the event of insolvency. There-
fore, they tend to concentrate on measures designed to minimize the risk of insol-
vency. According to table 3A.1, this type of regulation tends to reduce effi ciency.
Many LIC regulatory authorities hope that competition among private insur-
ers will keep loadings and hence premiums low. Companies are thus under 
increased pressure to keep their loading factors, particularly management and 
administration costs (µ), down. With regard to λ, the typical objective is not to 
reduce the safety loading component but possibly the profi t component. As a 
result, the expectation is that the effi ciency of insurance companies will improve 
and that consumers will have better choices at lower loadings and hence lower 
premiums (given the expected value of benefi ts paid).
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In an oligopolistic market, in which insurers pursue a Bertrand strategy (whereby 
price is the decision variable), rate wars cannot be entirely excluded. These wars 
would result in inadequate reserves and hence failure to mitigate the social cost of 
an insolvency. This argument pushes regulators to accept rather high premiums 
in the hope of maintaining a suffi ciently high safety loading. In LICs, oligopolistic 
insurance markets will be prevalent for some time to come, possibly justifying 
regulation that keeps the amount of loading and the premium high (Lee 2000).
In CBI schemes, members strictly regulate insurance packages and the pre-
mium rate—not to create reserves through a loading surcharge on the risk pre-
mium but to attract additional contributions (often in kind) in the event that 
their scheme runs a defi cit. The downside of the reduced loading is an increase 
in the residual asset variance for members; however, risky insurance is associated 
with reduced willingness to pay.
An elaborate regulatory framework usually governs public health insurance (as 
argued below, such insurance is subject to the greatest regulatory intensity). This 
framework adds to the administrative expense and hence the loading. The total 
amount of loading may still be low due to savings on the cost of acquisition.
Fraud and Abuse 
Fraud and abuse are closely related to the institutional framework (see annex 
3B). Fraud and abuse by the insured and their impact on the loading are dis-
cussed below. 
Fraud and abuse are an extreme form of moral hazard. In the case of ex ante 
moral hazard, preventive effort V could be said to turn negative, implying that 
the insured’s behavior increases the probability of illness to 1. A negative value 
of V may well be induced by insurance; in terms of equation (3.3), V’(I) would 
have to be strongly negative. Hence the amount of loading must increase rapidly 
with any increase in I. 
Fraud can also occur ex post, for example, in the guise of persuading provid-
ers to overstate medical bills. Again, this extreme form of ex post moral hazard is 
encouraged by a vanishing rate of coinsurance (or more generally, the absence of 
cost sharing). As soon as the insured have to pay parts of the medical bill out of 
pocket, they have an incentive to resist fraudulent overbilling. In general terms, the 
relationship between the degree of cost sharing c and benefi ts claimed I is strong 
in the presence of fraud. For the insurer, the term I’(c) in equation (3.4) takes on 
a very large value (in absolute terms), indicating that the total amount of loading 
must increase strongly with a decrease in cost sharing when fraud is prevalent.
As discussed above, fraud commonly occurs in LICs when hospitals and phy-
sicians allow cheaper products to replace more expensive alternatives (CORIS 
2003). The insurer must pay for the more expensive product, causing I to increase 
and, with it, the amount of loading, according to equation (3.3). In LICs the 
consequences may be severe, because poor people, who might be able to pay the 
premium in the absence of corruption, are now unable to afford insurance.
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As argued above, rural communities’ enormous sanctions and nearly com-
plete information mitigate moral hazard in CBI schemes. Therefore, the amount 
of loading due to fraud and abuse should not increase much in these schemes.
A public health insurance scheme operating in an LIC is under comparatively 
little pressure to control fraud and abuse; unlike private insurers, it does not 
have to compete for customers through a favorable benefi t-cost ratio (to which a 
low amount of loading contributes). 
VERTICAL RESTRAINTS/VERTICAL INTEGRATION
Two forms of vertical restraints (in the extreme, full vertical integration) can be 
distinguished: insurer driven and provider driven. A third form of integration 
is lateral and occurs when a fi rm outside the sector takes up business in health 
insurance or the provision of health care. This form of integration will be dealt 
with only in passing.
Insurer-Driven Vertical Integration
A private insurer can limit its activities to the refunding of medical expendi-
tures. This policy poses no vertical restraints and offers no opportunities for ver-
tical integration. Such a policy is costly to the insurer if medical care providers 
have monopolistic power. In that event, insurance coverage drives up providers’ 
markup over marginal cost. Figure 3.3, which builds on fi gure 3.2, illustrates this 
phenomenon. 
Figure 3.3 includes two marginal revenue (MR) functions. Without insurance 
coverage, the provider faces the MR function derived from the true demand func-
tion (MRt). The quantity satisfying the optimality condition, “marginal revenue 
equals marginal cost” (of health care services) is A. Accordingly, the monopoly 
price is P*, which already contains a markup over marginal cost. With insurance, 
the MR function becomes MRo, which is associated with the observed demand 
function. The new optimal quantity of services provided is B, consistent with 
a higher monopoly price at P**, refl ecting an increased markup over marginal 
cost. In this situation, the moral hazard effect of insurance not only consists of 
an increased quantity of consumption (B > A), but also higher prices (P** > P*). 
Because this effect boosts payments I, the amount of loading, and hence the price 
of insurance, increases, according to equation (3.3). One rationale of insurer-driven 
vertical integration is to avoid this extra moral hazard effect, given by (P** – P*).
In more general terms, the provision of health insurance and of health care 
services may be viewed as two parts of a system. The extra moral hazard effect 
then amounts to an externality within the system—one that the insurer may 
seek to mitigate by imposing vertical constraints on service providers. To be 
successful, the insurer must have a degree of monopoly power. Therefore, the 
objective of the insurer becomes to avoid a double monopoly markup, or double 
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marginalization (Waldman and Jensen 2001, 468f). The solution can be a two-
part remuneration scheme. First, the provider agrees to charge a price equal to 
marginal cost. Then the insurer pays a fi xed amount suffi cient to motivate the 
provider to sign the contract. In the extreme case, the insurer can opt for fully 
integrating service providers to avoid this externality and other externalities. 
The different possibilities form a continuum between independent provision 
and full vertical integration (see fi gure 3.4).
For example, when full integration would be ineffi cient, the insurer may limit 
itself to owning hospitals and contracting with ambulatory care providers. It 
also can mix insurer-managed plans with plans governed by contractual rela-
tionships devoid of vertical restraints. The imposition of restraints can be del-
egated, for example, to a medical association, but individual provider behavior is 
unlikely to be effectively restrained.
Some of the factors encouraging and hampering vertical integration by the 
insurer are listed in table 3.4. As a general observation, many LICs suffer from 
weak law enforcement. In Thailand, for example, legal actions, such as foreclo-
sure after insolvency, are infrequently executed for cultural and religious reasons 
(Harmer 2000). A weak legal infrastructure, corruption, and bribery saddle insur-
ers with high costs when they attempt to sanction breaches of contract in the 
FIGURE 3.3  Effect of Insurance Coverage on Monopolistic Pricing
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context of vertical relationships. However, vertical restraints provide the inte-
grating fi rm with incentives and sanctions, often permitting it to dispense with 
the clauses of offi cial contract law. This reality implies that not only the costs 
but also the benefi ts of vertical constraints and integration can be greater in LICs 
than in industrial countries. Therefore, the effects listed in table 3.3 are not gen-
erally reinforced or attenuated in CBI schemes or in private or public insurance 
in LICs; these effects must be individually examined.
Market Power of the Insurer 
Market power amounts to a necessary condition for the imposition of vertical 
restraints. If one of many insurers were to impose vertical restraints, a given 
service provider could strike a contract with a competitor that does not seek to 
impose such constraints. Moreover, as long as these constraints do not amount 
to exclusive dealings, failure to sign up with a particular insurer has negligible 
consequences for a service provider. Therefore, unless the insurer wields a degree 
of market power, service providers need not accept vertical restraints.
With regard to private health insurers operating in LICs, the defi nition of 
the relevant market is of some importance. Under present conditions, only the 
urban areas of most LICs form the relevant market. Because the number of insur-
ers with activity in LICs is smaller than in industrial countries to begin with, 
FIGURE 3.4  Forms of Vertical Restraints and Integration Imposed by the Insurer
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Source: Authors.
 Supply of Private Voluntary Health Insurance in Low-Income Countries 81
market concentration is more marked. In addition, barriers to entry usually are 
higher and antitrust policy more lenient, making market power easer to build 
up. This factor facilitates insurer-driven vertical integration in LICs.
Market power is high in the CBI segment of the market, because CBI schemes 
as a rule wield a monopoly in the rural area they serve. On this score, their 
degree of market power would certainly enable them ceteris paribus to impose 
vertical restraints.
A public health insurer, being a monopolist, can impose strong vertical restric-
tions on providers in terms of prices and products if not prevented by legislation. 
Market power can be abused; in particular, purchasing prices may be set so low as 
to drive foreign suppliers and privately funded hospitals out of the market. This 
power is more marked under a public insurance scheme than under a competi-
tive private insurance system. Grant and Grant (2002), citing an unpublished 
paper, refer to the example of a Sub-Saharan African country where payments by 
national health insurance are so low that service suppliers have to rely heavily 
on unoffi cial charges for fi nance. Using data from Transparency International, 
Grant and Grant show that up to 80 percent of recent transactions with health 
workers in certain countries involve an unoffi cial fee or a bribe.
TABLE 3.4  Factors Affecting Insurer-Driven Vertical Integration
Factor
Private insurance 
(competitive market)
Private insurance  
(in LICs)
Community-based 
insurance 
Public insurance 
(in LICs) 
Market power of the insurer + +    ↑ +    ↑ +
System effi ciency gains to 
be realized
+ + + +    ↓
Management know-how 
of insurer
+ + + +
Contestability of health 
care markets
+ +    ↓ +    ↓ +    ↓
Potential to increase entry 
barriers for competitors
+ + + n.a.
Contestability of health 
insurance market
– –    ↓ –    ↓ n.a.
Lack of capital of insurer – –    ↑ –    ↑ –    ↑
Opportunistic behavior and fraud 
on the part of insurers
– –    ↑ –    ↓ –    ↓
Cartelization of service providers – – –    ↓ –    ↓
Legislation prohibiting vertical 
restraints 
– –    ↓ –    ↓ –
Source: Authors.
Note: LICs = low-income countries; n.a. = not applicable. A plus sign means the factor increases vertical integration; a minus 
sign means it decreases such integration. An upward-pointing arrow indicates reinforcement of relationship; a downward-
pointing arrow indicates attenuation of relationship.
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System Effi ciency Gains to Be Realized
The double marginalization problem noted above is not the only within-system 
externality that vertical restraints can mitigate. One discussed in the industrial 
organization literature (Carlton and Perloff 1999, chapter 12) is the risk that 
the distributor delivers substandard quality, adversely affecting the producer’s 
reputation. In the present context, this risk translates into physicians and hospi-
tals skimping on quality in the treatment of patients enrolled with a particular 
insurer. The solution to this problem can be the insurer’s creation of a quality 
assurance scheme. 
Another problem that is more peculiar to the health care sector is fraud. As 
emphasized by Ma and McGuire (1997), the insurer has to rely on a report pro-
vided by the physician to be able to establish the appropriateness of treatment. 
The typical vertical restraint used here is a clause to the effect that service pro-
viders are to offer additional information in case of ambiguity.
A third within-system externality, of particular relevance to health care, is 
the “medical technology race.” Given that insurance coverage is complete and 
density of supply is high, service providers cannot compete much on the basis of 
price and location. An important remaining parameter of competition is medical 
technology. For the insurer it suffi ces to have few specialized providers offering 
the most advanced technology for diagnosis and treatment of a given health 
condition. Thus a technology race among the providers who are contractual 
partners amounts to a source of ineffi ciency. To avoid it, the insurer may assign 
providers to certain health conditions, at the same time guaranteeing them a 
minimum number of cases per period. Such a commitment can be supported 
by a premium reduction offered to enrollees in return for a restricted choice of 
provider, as is often the case with managed care contracts.
These within-system ineffi ciencies are of relevance to private health insur-
ers operating in LICs as well. First, double marginalization may be a problem, 
because physicians tend to be organized in urban areas, where private insurers 
typically are active. The risk of substandard quality being delivered is consider-
able; it may be mitigated somewhat when the insured pay and are reimbursed 
by the insurer. However, fraud is more common in LICs and promotes within-
system ineffi ciency. Finally, major cities of emerging economies appear to be 
engaged in a technological race. In the poorest LICs, one (public) hospital 
located in the capital offers advanced medical technology. Some of the insured 
prefer not to be treated there but to travel to an industrial country. Imposing a 
vertical restraint on institutions located abroad is beyond the capability of insur-
ers in LICs, however. 
CBI schemes face a double marginalization problem. In the rural areas where 
they operate, an individual physician or hospital may be a local monopolist. 
The fact that CBI schemes contract with nonprofi t institutions is of limited rele-
vance as soon as these providers must recover their cost. Quite likely the patients 
treated free of charge or at a reduced fee are those without any insurance cov-
erage. Higher fees from those with insurance protection—the members of CBI 
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schemes—must neutralize the defi cit. Provision of substandard quality therefore 
can be an issue for these schemes. Because these providers are also monopo-
lists in their local labor markets, they pay a comparatively low wage and are 
unlikely to attract the most skilled health care workers. With regard to fraud, CBI 
schemes may benefi t from the nonprofi t status of missionary and other hospitals 
(see Ramani 1996); however, public hospitals have a tradition of cheating to ease 
bureaucratic processes. The technological race between competing providers can 
be excluded from consideration, because CBI schemes are localized primarily in 
rural areas of LICs, where local monopolies prevail.
Another source of effi ciency gain, peculiar to CBI schemes, is mode of pay-
ment. In many rural areas of LICs, service providers are paid in kind. However, 
service providers generally prefer to receive cash, leading some schemes to use 
so-called moneylenders who transform the in-kind contributions of CBI mem-
bers into cash to be paid to providers. In return, hospitals in particular have been 
willing to accept prospective payment for treating CBI members, which consti-
tutes a vertical restraint.
A public health insurer operating in an LIC is protected by a monopoly and 
therefore is under comparatively little pressure to reap any system effi ciency gains 
through vertical restraints. Therefore, this particular motivation is viewed as of 
less importance for public health insurers than for competing private insurers. 
Management Know-How of Insurer
Ample management know-how helps companies successfully negotiate and 
monitor vertical restraints, especially in the context of full vertical integration, 
which presupposes the insurer’s understanding of how to effi ciently run pro-
vider facilities. 
Management expertise is much lower in LICs. Education is a good proxy for 
such expertise, and the augmented Barro-Lee dataset (World Bank 2000) provides 
evidence that average years of schooling are substantially lower in developing 
countries than in industrial countries. At one extreme are Afghanistan, Ban-
gladesh, and Mozambique, with values of 1.7, 1.1, and 2.6 years, respectively. 
At the other extreme are countries such as Australia and Norway, with values 
of 10.9 years and 11.8 years, respectively. This indirect evidence suggests that 
health insurers in LICs generally lack the know-how necessary to impose vertical 
restraints and implement full vertical integration. 
Management expertise is even scarcer in CBI schemes, making vertical 
restraints less likely than conventional, often not fully specifi ed, contracts with 
service providers. For public health insurance, management expertise may be 
roughly comparable to that of private health insurers operating in LICs.
Contestability of Health Care Markets
Contestable markets are characterized by an actual or potential infl ux of suppli-
ers when incentives to enter become strong. As the experience of managed care 
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organizations in the United States suggests, newcomers to the market for medi-
cal services are likely to accept the corresponding vertical restraints.
Barriers to entry are generally higher in LICs than in industrial countries 
(WTO 2003), and this difference is expected to affect markets for health care 
services. This means that an insurer doing business in an LIC has diffi culty in 
fi nding providers willing to agree to vertical restraints. 
Having their centers of activity in rural areas, CBI schemes cannot count 
much on the contestability of the health care markets with which they deal. 
Service providers move, if at all, from the countryside to the cities. Therefore, 
CBIs’ chances of fi nding partners that accept vertical constraints are rather slim.
To a public health insurer, increased contestability of health care markets 
facilitates vertical restraints. However, public administrators still have to seek 
out alternate providers; their incentive to undertake this effort may be under-
mined by the monopoly status of the scheme.
Potential to Increase Entry Barriers to Competitors
One motivation for vertical restraints and integration can be to keep potential 
entrants out of the insurance market.2 Incumbent insurers can do this by tying 
up the scarce supply of health care services, with which potential entrants must 
establish contractual relationships to build a delivery system. Given the com-
plexity and high human capital content of health care services, controlling a 
part of health care supply can constitute a more effective barrier than closing the 
insurance market itself. However, an outsider can overcome this barrier by offer-
ing compensation high enough to make health care suppliers leave the vertical 
arrangement, but such compensation tends to be above the level a newcomer is 
willing to pay (Carlton and Perloff 1999, 357).
The same argument applies to LICs and to the urban areas where private 
health insurers typically operate. 
CBI schemes benefi t from a different type of barrier to entry, which obviates 
the use of vertical integration to protect their markets from outside competition. 
Credit markets suggest this particular barrier. In rural areas, most community 
credit schemes are set up along kinship lines. In the case of Nigeria, more than 
95 percent of borrowing and lending occurs within a community scheme oper-
ated by and for a tribe. This phenomenon suggests that a potential challenger to 
an incumbent CBI scheme would have to surmount a high barrier in the form of 
kinship relationships.  
To a public health insurance scheme, the potential of vertical integration to 
reinforce market entry barriers has no relevance, because law prohibits entry by 
competitors. 
Contestability of Health Insurance Markets
When insurance markets are and remain contestable, incumbent insurers will 
be strapped for resources to defend their position; they are absorbed in ensuring 
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their survival in the market. In addition, when insurers have to compete because 
entry or exit barriers are low, their profi tability is driven down to the competi-
tive return; funds and management time will be too scarce for insurers to impose 
vertical restraints or even engage in full vertical integration. 
Barriers to entry and exit can be substantial in LICs. Some incumbent insurance 
companies, like Cigna in India, provide both health insurance and health care 
services. In this way, they can reap the within-effi ciency gains discussed above. 
In addition, they operate in a market with many reasonably homogeneous risks 
and thus benefi t from economies of scale. These factors combine to enable them 
to offer private health insurance products at a lower cost than a smaller potential 
rival. Furthermore, incumbent insurance companies are able to increase spending 
in advertising campaigns, which can further strengthen barriers to entry.
As to barriers to exit, long-term labor contracts are often the norm in the 
formal sectors of LICs. Therefore, when exiting from the market, an insurer may 
have to continue to pay for employees who are redundant. This necessity pro-
vides an incentive for incumbents to defend their position against a new rival. In 
summary, insurance markets in LICs do not appear to be very contestable, a fact 
that fosters vertical restraints and vertical integration, ceteris paribus.
With regard to CBI schemes, barriers to entry emanate mainly from the char-
acteristics of informal markets. Many health insurers that might consider entry 
do not accept in-kind payment of the premium. This payment may take the 
form of cattle and even the provision of bonded labor and the cession of land 
rights. Thus, barriers to entry do not appear to hamper CBI schemes’ imposition 
of vertical restraints, ceteris paribus.
In the case of a public health insurer, the contestability of the market for 
health insurance again has no relevance, because the law makes that market 
incontestable.
Lack of Capital of Insurer
Lack of capital is another impediment to integration. Full vertical integration 
(but less so vertical restraints) often requires a capital investment on the part of 
the fi rm acquiring control. If internal fi nance is available, management enjoys 
some leeway in deciding about such an investment, monitoring by the fi rm 
owners being incomplete. Lacking internal fi nance, the integrating fi rm has to 
convince banks and investors that vertical integration will improve profi tability 
and that the debt can be repaid. 
In many LICs, domestic capital markets and the banking industry are not 
fully developed, and access to international capital markets is exceedingly costly. 
Thus, the alternative of external fi nance often does not exist. In this situation, 
lack of capital on the part of the insurer can make full integration of a hospital, 
for example, impossible.
CBI schemes are organized as mutuals and thus do not sell tradable shares 
of ownership. Therefore, external equity fi nance, except through increasing 
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membership, is precluded. However, increasing membership is problematic, 
because a scheme may lose its homogeneity and hence an important cost advan-
tage. Finance through banks, for example, is also diffi cult, because CBI schemes 
cannot offer marketable collateral. However, in some cases, lateral integration may 
help. Citing the experience of communities in Bangladesh, Desmet, Chowdhury, 
and Islam (1999) argue that community-based credit schemes, in which many 
individuals are already involved, may provide the entry point to fi nance health 
insurance. But on the whole, lack of capital constitutes an even greater impedi-
ment to integration for CBI schemes than for private insurers operating in LICs. 
Lack of capital also hampers vertical integration of public health insurance 
schemes, which are not permitted to accumulate funds or issue debt for capital 
investment. Initiatives of this type would be interpreted as a sign of for-profi t 
orientation.
Opportunistic Behavior and Fraud on the Part of Insurers
Insurers with a reputation for opportunistic and fraudulent behavior have dif-
fi culty striking contracts that call for vertical restraints. By engaging in oppor-
tunistic behavior, insurers infl ict damage on providers, albeit at the expense of 
their own reputation and credibility. This damage reduces the insurers’ chances 
of successfully arranging vertical restraints with providers. Insurers must estab-
lish a good credit and payment reputation to win providers over for vertical 
restraints.
Opportunistic behavior and fraud is common in LICs (see discussion above 
and annex 3B), where weak legal infrastructures and complicated and time-con-
suming bureaucratic procedures promote such behavior on the part of insurers 
in general. Providers will be especially reluctant to agree to vertical restraints 
when they cannot rely on receiving their share of the attainable effi ciency gain. 
However, fraud appears to be a minor issue in CBI schemes, because service 
providers wield a local monopoly in many cases. If found cheating, a CBI scheme 
stands to lose the one available provider in its region. Because this reality consti-
tutes an effective sanctioning mechanism, CBI schemes and providers can more 
easily agree on vertical restraints. 
Public insurers can also engage in opportunistic behavior and fraud, under-
mining the willingness of service providers to enter into vertical agreements. 
However, this effect is attenuated by providers’ understanding that they have no 
choice but to sign up if they want to profi t from the demand-enhancing effect 
of insurance coverage. 
Cartelization of Service Providers
On the provider side, cartelization makes the imposition of vertical constraints 
diffi cult. First, the cartel is a means for providers to jointly increase their incomes. 
An insurer seeking to negotiate a vertical restraint must beat this benchmark. Sec-
ond, a cartel must impose discipline on its members to be successful. Restrictions 
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on output, however, confl ict with the integrating fi rm’s desire to avoid double 
marginalization, which may result in the imposition of a minimum volume of 
sales. In the present context, a medical association would want its members to 
maintain a low volume of treatments to support higher fees. However, an insurer 
may want to contract for a minimum volume of services at a fi xed fee to avoid 
insurance coverage’s upward pressure on fees (see fi gure 3.3). 
Health insurers considering vertical restraints in LICs are confronted with 
much the same problems, because physicians in particular are highly organized 
in urban areas.
To CBI schemes, cartelization of health care providers has little relevance. In 
rural areas of LICs, providers are suffi ciently protected from competition through 
mere distance. They can therefore do without the protection afforded by a cartel.
For a public health insurance scheme, cartelization of providers constitutes 
an obstacle to vertical restraints and integration in much the same way as for a 
private insurer. But because the cartel has no one else with whom to contract, it 
may agree to a uniform set of vertical agreements to secure the viability of the 
system (and its demand-enhancing effect) as a whole.
Legislation Prohibiting Vertical Restraints
Restraints can be impossible when legislation prohibits vertical restraints and 
integration in the health care sector. For example, in several industrial coun-
tries, only individuals with a medical degree can own medical practices or hos-
pitals or both. At the very least, medical management must lie in the hands of 
physicians.
In many LICs, such ownership and management rules are not fully enforced, 
because legal infrastructure is often weak, not least due to corruption. Moreover, 
church hospitals are generally exempted. These hospitals contribute importantly 
to the provision of health care, and sponsors would have to cease operations if 
required to ensure management by a physician. Whether an exemption would 
be extended to a private insurer acquiring a church hospital is unclear.
CBI schemes, by contrast, appear to face few legal impediments to vertical 
integration. In fact, they have cooperated with missionary hospitals in several 
countries, including Indonesia, Kenya, and Uganda.
A public health insurer presumably must respect legislation concerning verti-
cal integration in the same way that a private insurer does, because the objective 
of this legislation is to secure the independence of the comparatively small busi-
nesses of health care providers. 
Provider-Driven Vertical Integration
The second type of vertical integration is provider driven. The typical case would 
be a hospital chain that seeks to avoid double marginalization in its dealings with 
insurers that wield a degree of market power. The chain may view an insurer as 
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a sales channel, through which promotional efforts are decisive for the market 
success of its products. (If insurers provide an insuffi cient amount of advice to 
future patients, client matching suffers, with unfavorable effects on the hospital’s 
reputation.) A competing insurer could “free-ride” on these efforts by letting the 
other insurer make them while selling its own policy at a lower premium. Such 
free riding would of course undermine an insurer’s incentive to provide advice. 
The solution to the problem can be the assignment of exclusive territories to 
insurers or even exclusive dealings (Carlton and Perloff, 1999, 403–05). 
In general, the factors promoting provider-driven vertical restraints and integra-
tion (see table 3.5) are the same ones hampering their insurer-driven counterparts 
(see table 3.3). With regard to public health insurance, however, provider-driven 
vertical integration is regarded as inapplicable (see table 3.4). The reason is that 
a hospital or a group of physicians will fi nd it impossible to impose rules on a 
public agency, for example, with regard to the amount of contribution to be paid 
by the insured. For full integration, they would have to acquire property in the 
agency, which is unimaginable according to known legal codes.
Market Power of Service Provider
As in the case of insurer-driven vertical constraints and integration, market power 
is a necessary condition for success. This condition usually is not satisfi ed by a 
single physician but may be met by a physician network, or a hospital with a 
large catchment area. 
Hospitals generally are much more sparse in LICs than in industrial countries. 
This reality has sometimes enabled hospitals in LICs to integrate insurance busi-
ness into their operations (see table 3.5). Moreover, the leniency of antitrust 
authorities has resulted in a high concentration of hospital markets. In South 
Africa, several hospital groups were able to merge, so that only a few units con-
trolled most of private health provision3 (Soderlund, Schierhout, and van den 
Heever 1998). Eventually, some of the groups integrated health insurance into 
their business. In India, the Apollo hospital group, which has a substantial share 
of the market, also writes health insurance. 
In the rural areas where CBI schemes are typically active, hospitals have the 
market power to impose vertical restraints on insurers or to integrate insurance, 
as the Kisiizi hospitals of Uganda have done (see table 3.5). 
System Effi ciency Gains to Be Realized
Possible effi ciency gains are the same as those discussed above. Conceivably, an 
insurer has enough market power to increase premiums independently of the 
amount of payment to service providers. The result is double marginalization, 
which this time hurts the health care provider.
An insurer can skimp on quality by delaying reimbursement of patients and 
by having unjustifi ed recourse to small print in its insurance policy. Whether 
the reputation of the service provider, rather than that of the insurer, suffers is 
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unclear. If the reputation of the insurer suffers, no externality affects the health 
care provider.
In the same vein, fraud by the insurer (in particular, failure to pay in the event 
of insolvency) might constitute a source of within-system ineffi ciency. The insurer, 
rather than the provider, is likely to suffer the loss of reputation in this case. 
Negative external effects due to insurers engaging in a technological race do 
not appear to be an issue. 
Incentives for health care providers to integrate health insurance into their 
operations appear to be rather weak. However, provider-based insurance schemes 
may have some cost advantages compared with a nonintegrated competitor, 
because they already have some relevant risk information about the insured. 
This effi ciency gain accrues to health care providers. 
In many LICs, the problem of double marginalization is particularly acute, 
because insurers are allowed to engage in mergers and acquisitions to build sub-
stantial market power. In addition, private insurers may be more likely than 
health insurers operating in industrial countries to offer substandard quality of 
services, for example, by delaying payment for health care costs, which could 
negatively affect the health care provider’s reputation. Fraud and opportunistic 
TABLE 3.5  Factors Affecting Provider-Driven Vertical Integration
Factor
Private insurance 
(competitive market)
Private insurance 
(in LICs)
Community-based 
insurance (in LICs)
Public insurance 
(in LICs)
Market power of service 
provider
+ +    ↑ +    ↑ n.a.
System effi ciency gains to 
be realized 
+ + + n.a.
Management know-how of 
provider
+ + + n.a.
Contestability of insurance 
market 
+ +    ↓ +    ↓ n.a.
Potential to increase entry 
barriers to competitors
+ + + n.a.
Contestability of health 
care markets
– –    ↓ –    ↓ n.a.
Lack of capital of service 
providers
– – – n.a.
Market power of insurer – –    ↑ –    ↑ n.a.
Cartelization of insurers – –    ↓ –    ↓ n.a.
Legislation prohibiting 
vertical restraints 
– – – n.a.
Source: Authors.
Note: LICs = low-income countries; n.a. = not applicable. A plus sign means the factor increases vertical integration; a minus 
sign means it decreases such integration. An upward-pointing arrow indicates reinforcement of relationship; a downward-
pointing arrow indicates attenuation of relationship.
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behavior can lead to within-system ineffi ciency; typically, the solution is full 
vertical integration. Finally, a technological race among insurers, which would 
motivate imposition of vertical restraints, is not evidenced.
Health care providers and, in particular, hospitals dealing with CBI schemes 
must take into account double marginalization, because a given scheme usually 
is the monopoly supplier of health insurance in its region. This consideration 
promotes vertical restraints or even full integration. However, CBI schemes’ 
delivery of substandard service is rather a remote possibility. After all, the insured 
own the schemes, and they would suffer from a lower-than-contracted quality 
of service (Musau 1999). In addition, hospitals are confronted with fraudulent 
behavior on the part of CBI schemes, as evidenced by a study of Chogoria Hos-
pital in Kenya. Schemes running group policies allowed nonmembers (who ini-
tially were not identifi able as such at the point of service) to present themselves 
for treatment, creating bad debts for the hospital (Musau 1999). A technological 
race is not an issue, because most CBI schemes lack the resources to build sub-
stantial administrative capacity. 
On the whole, providers in LICs appear to have no stronger incentives than 
providers in industrial countries to avoid within-system ineffi ciencies through 
vertical integration. 
Management Know-How of Provider
Management know-how facilitates implementation of vertical restraints and 
especially vertical integration. But, as noted above, average years of schooling in 
developing countries can be very low, suggesting that domestic health provid-
ers in LICs have diffi culty mastering the skills to effectively apply management 
know-how that is needed to impose vertical restrains, vertical integration, or 
both on insurers. 
The lack of management know-how is still more marked in CBI schemes, lead-
ing to even fewer vertical restraints and less vertical integration between health 
providers and insurers.
Contestability of Insurance Market 
If the market for health insurance is contestable, a health care provider consider-
ing vertical integration can strike an agreement with newcomers to increase its 
likelihood of successfully imposing vertical constraints.
As noted above, barriers to entry in LICs are higher in general than in indus-
trial countries. This difference is also expected to translate to the market for 
health insurance. That is, a health provider doing business in an LIC has diffi -
culty fi nding private insurers that may be willing to agree to vertical restraints. 
Because CBI schemes are organized along kinship lines, their markets are not 
much contested. A newcomer would have to make substantial investments to 
match the advantages of social control enjoyed by CBI schemes. 
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In summary, health care providers, whether private and profi t oriented or 
community based, face considerable obstacles in seeking to impose vertical con-
straints on health insurers in LICs.
Potential to Increase Entry Barriers to Competitors
Vertical restraints and integration can serve a strategic purpose by raising the 
entry barrier, for example, to a new hospital. Similarly, physician networks can 
set up an insurance scheme to the disadvantage of outside physicians. 
South African hospitals have found it diffi cult to establish themselves in areas 
controlled by incumbent groups at least in part because the groups offer health 
insurance. 
Hospitals dealing with CBI schemes, which are local monopolies, could in 
principle attempt to protect their markets by integrating with the CBI scheme 
operating in their catchment area. However, the little evidence available suggests 
that the main motive for provider-driven vertical integration is the prospect of 
eliminating within-system ineffi ciencies.
Contestability of Health Care Markets 
Providers fi nd it diffi cult to integrate themselves with insurers if their market 
is contestable, because they must devote much of their resources to defending 
their position in the market, which leaves few resources for investing in vertical 
restraints and integration. 
Health care markets are less contestable in LICs than in industrial countries, 
because bureaucratic hurdles are more substantial in LICs. Ceteris paribus, these 
hurdles give incumbent hospitals the leeway to impose vertical restraints or pur-
sue vertical integration. 
Most health care providers doing business with CBI schemes are located in 
poor rural areas. Because any monopoly rents must be of fairly small amount, 
the incentive for a new competitor to break into the market is weak, and the 
degree of market contestability is therefore small. 
Lack of Capital of Service Providers 
Physician networks may lack capital because their joint liability status impedes 
their access to capital markets. In a deregulated, competitive market, for-profi t 
hospitals, and especially hospital groups, may offer an investment with favor-
able hedging properties. With a measure of independence from the capital mar-
ket and hence comparatively low β, they can raise capital at a lower cost than 
other industries.
Many LICs have limited access to international capital markets, which means 
that little capital is available to domestic health care providers. This lack of capi-
tal hampers vertical integration. 
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Lack of formal capital is an even greater problem in the case of health care pro-
viders dealing with CBI schemes. In rural areas, neither physicians nor hospitals 
have easy access to domestic capital markets. In addition, they have diffi culty rais-
ing internal fi nance, because intermediation by moneylenders is incomplete. 
Market Power of Insurer
Insurers with market power require ample compensation to allow themselves 
to be constrained or integrated. As argued above, insurers tend to have more 
market power in LICs than in industrial countries. Insurers’ possession of market 
power hampers provider-driven vertical integration.
In CBI schemes, the market power of insurers is high, because these insurers 
usually are the only suppliers of health insurance coverage. Ceteris paribus, a 
health care provider that wishes to impose vertical integration would fi nd it dif-
fi cult to do so. 
Cartelization of Insurers
The costs of negotiation within a cartel of insurers are high, because all members 
of the cartel must be included in the negotiation. 
As noted above, the degree of cartelization is likely to be higher in LICs than 
in other countries, because agreements can be struck at a lower cost among fewer 
participants. In LICs, fraud and opportunistic behavior add to the costs of nego-
tiating an agreement. Moreover, the likelihood of detection and punishment 
is low, because antitrust authorities tend to be weak. These realities promote 
insurer cartels and hence hamper provider-driven vertical integration. 
With regard to CBI schemes, cartelization is of little relevance for two reasons. 
First, the fact that these schemes often operate along kinship lines makes hori-
zontal agreements diffi cult to reach. Second, CBI schemes usually constitute a 
monopoly and thus have little interest in the protection from competition that 
a cartel affords. 
Legislation Prohibiting Vertical Restraints
Legislation might prohibit medical providers from owning an insurer. However, 
the authors are aware of no such legislation.
Actual Examples of Integration 
Table 3.6 presents some of the existing variants of insurer-driven and provider-
driven vertical integration as well as lateral integration and illustrates that all 
these types of integration may involve community-based insurers and private, 
for-profi t insurers in industrialized countries and in LICs. 
 Supply of Private Voluntary Health Insurance in Low-Income Countries 93
TABLE 3.6  Forms of Integration
Indicator Variants
Private, for-
profi t insurers Insurers in LICs
Community-based 
insurers
Insurer driven Insurer runs 
clinics and 
ambulatory care 
centers
Insurer owns 
ambulatory care 
centers
British United 
Provident 
Association 
offers private 
health insurance 
and cooperates 
closely with 
domestic health 
care providers
Cigna, a U.S. insurance 
company, provides health 
insurance and health care 
services in India
Holding Banmédica S.A., the 
second biggest private health 
insurer in Chile, formed an 
alliance with Las Américas 
of the Penta group, which 
primarily offers health care 
services and controls Chile’s 
largest private hospital, Clínica 
Alemana
In South Africa, Fedsure 
Holdings, which owns and 
controls subsidiaries involved 
in life insurance, purchased 
substantial shares in Network 
Healthcare Holdings, the 
largest private hospital group 
in South Africa
Atiman Health 
Insurance Scheme in 
Tanzania cooperates 
closely with local 
health care providers
Provider driven Hospital set 
up insurance 
schemes
Ambulatory 
care centers/ 
association 
of doctors set 
up insurance 
schemes
Community 
hospitals in rural 
Pennsylvania in 
the United States 
formed a risk 
retention group 
made up of similar 
entities that pool 
resources and 
insure their own 
members
Apollo hospitals group in India 
extended health insurance 
through alliances with private 
insurance providers
In Uganda, Kisiizi 
Hospital and the 
Engozi Society provide 
a CBI scheme
Chogoria Hospital 
in Kenya offers an 
insurance scheme
Lateral Companies/ 
cooperatives 
active in the credit 
or insurance 
sector extended 
their product line 
An insurance 
product line 
in Singapore 
was extended 
to include 
bancassurance 
activity
Bangladesh (Desmet) The Chogoria Hospital 
Insurance Scheme 
in Kenya focuses 
increasingly on 
treatment of HIV 
Source: Authors.
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Market Structure
Aside from degree of vertical integration, other important dimensions of market 
structure typically are number of buyers and sellers and degree of product differ-
entiation (Carlton and Perloff 1999, chapter 1). Number of buyers has not been 
an issue in health insurance markets, even in countries where employers are 
involved in its provision. Degree of product differentiation increases with the 
number of sellers unless economics of scope are very marked (see below). 
One aspect of market structure omitted here is the legal form of the insurance 
company. Originally, most health insurers were mutuals, presumably because as 
such they could attain a reasonable degree of homogeneity of risks. Homogene-
ity of risks ensures that the variance of total claims to be paid does not increase 
without bounds when risks are added (Malinvaud 1972, appendix). A fi nite vari-
ance in turn implies that the expected value of the loss can be estimated with 
increased precision (a decreased standard error according to the law of large 
numbers), permitting the insurer to hold fewer reserves per unit risk while hold-
ing its probability of insolvency constant (Cummins 1991). However, mutuals 
are at a disadvantage when it comes to raising capital for expanding their risk 
pool, because they do not issue tradable ownership shares. For this reason, the 
preferred legal form of insurers in industrialized countries has become the pub-
licly traded stock company. 
Health insurers in LICs do not rely to the same extent as insurers in indus-
trialized countries on their (local) capital market, which usually is not very 
developed. Indeed, the mutual form is alive and even thriving in the guise of 
CBI schemes. With increasing demand for capital to fi nance expansion, these 
schemes may become stock companies. For the purpose of the present exposi-
tion, it is taken as given that CBI schemes and private insurers (which need not 
be stock companies) will continue to coexist in LICs for the foreseeable future. 
Diversity of Preferences
With greater diversity of preferences, a large set of differentiated insurance prod-
ucts is necessary to match supply with demand. This diversity of preferences cre-
ates the potential for niche products written by specialized insurers, and therefore 
an increased number of companies, ceteris paribus. But according to the theory 
of consumer demand, diversity of preferences arises only when income becomes 
suffi ciently high. When income is low, the attainable consumption set in attribute 
space is too restricted to permit choices that lie far apart. Therefore, the number of 
profi table product varieties (and usually fi rms) is low when income is low.
In keeping with this argument, the concentration of sellers is expected to be 
high in LIC markets for private health insurance. Moreover, sellers cluster in 
urban areas, where the number of high-income earners is large enough to cre-
ate a pool of suffi cient size and hence an acceptable loading factor λ, resulting 
in a viable total loading. In the case of CBI schemes, lack of access to the capital 
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market, which limits the size of the unit and its geographical expansion, creates 
a countervailing effect. The balance of the two infl uences is an open issue.
Economies of Scale
The size of an insurer’s risk pool may be the source of economies of scale, defi ned 
as decreasing unit cost as a function of the number of individuals insured. 
According to the law of large numbers, a larger pool size enables the insurer to 
reduce its reserves per unit risk without increasing its risk of insolvency (Cum-
mins 1991, table 1). Hence, a large insurer’s premiums contain a smaller amount 
of loading than a small insurer’s premiums and give rise to a lower premium for 
a given amount of expected benefi ts. A large insurer could therefore increase its 
market share; a possible outcome is the so-called natural monopoly. 
However, a large pool may require the insurer’s acceptance of less favorable 
risks; the consequence may be a rise in the expected value of the benefi t to 
be paid. In addition, a large pool can be associated with a loss of social con-
trol among the insured, which promotes moral hazard. According to equations 
(3.2) and (3.3) above, both effects cause the amount of loading to increase, 
thus counteracting economies of scale. Empirical evidence on this issue in the 
domain of insurance, let alone health insurance, is lacking. However, the avail-
able evidence points to constant rather than increasing returns to scale (see, 
for example, Fecher, Perelman, and Pestieau 1991). Absent economies of scale, 
however, a particularly high degree of concentration in private insurance mar-
kets is unlikely.
Fujita, Krugman, and Venables (1999) argue that economies of scale occur 
because of positive spatial externalities. These externalities may explain why 
health insurers in LICs concentrate mainly in urban areas. Strong centripetal 
forces that draw businesses to one another (because fi rms may want to share a 
customer base or local services and to have access to trained and experienced 
labor) outweigh weaker centrifugal forces that drive businesses from one another 
(because fi rms compete for labor and land). The former forces constitute spill-
over effects and result in economies of scale in the guise of lowered administra-
tion and advertising costs. As such, they encourage market concentration. 
Table 3.7 focuses on factors infl uencing degree of market concentration. It has 
no entries for public health insurers in LICs, because these insurers are assumed 
to be monopolies.
Fujita, Krugman, and Venables (1999), although not focusing on CBI schemes, 
also provide an explanation for concentration of CBIs in rural areas. There, strong 
centripetal forces (such as capability to serve certain customers and acceptance of 
informal market behavior such as bartering) outweigh weaker centrifugal forces 
(such as small customer base, poor infrastructure, and an underdeveloped capi-
tal market). Economies of scale may occur due to the former forces and, given 
the market characteristics of CBI schemes, lower unit costs.
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Economies of Scope
Economies of scope prevail if the cost of providing an extra unit of coverage in one 
line of business decreases as a function of the volume written in some other line. In 
the context of health insurance, economies of scope may operate at two levels. 
First, a fi rm’s health insurance line may benefi t from the fi rm’s other business 
activities. A fi rm may be able to market health insurance through its network for 
selling banking services, for example. The health insurance market’s tendency 
toward increased concentration is indirect and hence not very marked in this 
case. Moreover, the limited amount of available empirical evidence suggests that 
economies of scope at this level are not important (Suret 1991). 
Second, however, health insurers A and B, whether they are community-based 
insurers or private insurers operating in LICs, may realize that although their 
products are differentiated, the costs of marketing and administering those of A 
increase less than proportionately when the quantity of B’s products increases. 
Therefore, the amount of loading would increase less than proportionately with 
the expected volume of benefi ts combined, providing a powerful motive for a 
merger of the two companies. Given economies of scope of this second type (often 
called “synergies”), market concentration tends to increase, but the number of 
product varieties does not necessarily decrease. In this case, the number of product 
varieties sold in the market does not vary in step with the number of fi rms.
Barriers to Entry
High market-entry barriers exist when a newcomer must make large investments 
that it cannot recuperate if entry fails (high sunk costs). Barriers to entry thus 
increase market concentration. They are clearly relevant in health insurance 
TABLE 3.7  Factors Affecting the Degree of Concentration of Health Insurance Sellers in 
Markets for Private Health Insurance
Factor
Private insurance 
(competitive market) Private insurance (in LICs)
Community-based 
insurance
Diversity of preferences – –    ↓ –
Economies of scale +/– + +
Economies of scope + + +
Barriers to entry + +    ↑ +    ↑
Barriers to exit – –    ↑ –    ↑
Antitrust policy – –    ↓ –    ↓
Source: Authors.
Note: LICs = low-income countries. A plus sign means the factor increases concentration; a minus sign means it decreases 
concentration. An upward-pointing arrow indicates reinforcement of relationship; a downward-pointing arrow indicates 
attenuation of relationship.
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markets, in which newcomers usually must launch extensive advertising cam-
paigns to gain even a small share of the market. Newcomers cannot recuperate 
this investment if they withdraw from the market. 
A small number of sellers makes negotiation and monitoring of collusive 
agreements comparatively inexpensive. For this reason, concentration poses a 
threat to price and product competition in insurance markets. However, col-
lusive agreements can be destabilized by the emergence of a new competitor. 
Destabilization is less likely to occur when barriers to entry are high. Therefore, 
barriers to entry not only increase concentration but may also reinforce the anti-
competitive effects that usually accompany a high degree of concentration.
These considerations apply to health insurance markets in LICs as well as in 
industrialized countries. However, LICs frequently impose additional barriers to 
entry in the guise of restrictions on foreign ownerships. Thailand, for example, 
limits foreign equity in new local insurance fi rms to 25 percent or less (USTR 
1998). Neighboring Malaysia offers 51 percent equity in insurance to foreign 
investors (WDM 2005), which is still substantially lower than ownership quotas 
in Indonesia, where 80 percent foreign ownership of joint ventures is allowed, 
and in the Philippines, where 100 percent is permitted. High barriers to entry 
contribute to the concentration of domestic health insurance markets. 
The informal nature of the market reinforces barriers to entry in CBI schemes 
(for example, not all insurance companies are willing to accept payment in kind). 
Furthermore, the relationship between the insurance scheme and its members 
usually develops over a long period of time (which helps to minimize moral 
hazard effects). A newcomer to a CBI scheme would have to make a substantial 
and nonrecuperable investment to acquire this experience. This investment con-
stitutes a barrier to entry and thus facilitates concentration in the CBI segment 
of the market for health insurance.
Barriers to Exit
When challenged by a newcomer, incumbents may consider exiting from the 
market rather than defending their position. However, exit is not an attractive 
alternative if it entails the loss of investments that cannot be recuperated (sunk 
costs). For instance, a sales force specialized in health insurance is not an asset 
once the fi rm leaves the market; even with economies of scope, it has a reduced 
value, for example, in selling life insurance. Barriers to exit thus decrease concen-
tration. However, through their stabilizing effect, they help to preserve collusive 
agreements, reinforcing the anticompetitive effect of concentration. Bailouts of 
ailing companies also modify the opportunity cost of leaving the market, thus 
creating a barrier to exit. 
As noted above, barriers to entry in LICs are higher than in industrial coun-
tries, a difference that is expected to hold for private health insurance as well. 
In addition, given the small number of private health insurers in LICs, bailouts 
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tend to decrease concentration but also to have a marked anticompetitive effect 
in light of weak antitrust policies. On the whole, high barriers to exit keep the 
degree of concentration in LICs’ health insurance markets low, all other factors 
being equal.
Still higher barriers to exit may characterize markets in which CBI schemes 
operate. These schemes benefi t from their favorable reputation and established 
social control mechanisms (limiting, in particular, ex post moral hazard). These 
advantages are lost if a CBI scheme exits the market. Again, market exit increases 
concentration, all other factors being equal.  
Antitrust Policy
In many countries, merger projects must be submitted to antitrust authorities. 
Mergers that would result in a notable increase in the level of concentration 
are subject to scrutiny according to the rules followed by both the U.S. Federal 
Trade Commission and the Commission of the European Union. To date, few 
mergers of health insurers have been blocked. Nevertheless, antitrust policy 
can have an impact on concentration. Indeed, the mere risk of a merger pro-
posal’s rejection may keep concentration at a level lower than otherwise would 
be maintained.
Antitrust policy is less effective in many LICs than in industrialized countries. 
For instance, in South Africa a recent wave of mergers between health insur-
ers, between pharmaceutical manufacturers, and between hospital groups has 
resulted in a small number of companies controlling most of the private health 
care industry (Soderlund, Schierhout, and van den Heever 1998). Although most 
insurance markets probably remain reasonably competitive, further consolida-
tion might lead to nearly monopolistic positions for certain players in several 
geographic areas. 
Mergers of CBI schemes are rare, but not because of effective antitrust policies. 
Arguably, antitrust policies do not take effect in CBI schemes. These schemes 
consist of small groups, whose members share common characteristics like close 
family and community relationships. Mergers between CBI schemes thus come 
at the cost of increased heterogeneity, which appears to greatly outweigh the 
mergers’ benefi ts. The literature on credit markets offers evidence on the impor-
tance of market segmentation along geographic and kinship lines. Udry (1993, 
95) discovered that loans between individuals in the same village or kinship 
group accounted for 97 percent of the value of transactions. Virtually no loans 
were provided to outside communities, as information about repayment pros-
pects and village sanctions as a mechanism for contract enforcement were lack-
ing. Similar evidence on informal credit markets is reported in a case study of 
rural China (Feder, Lin, and Xiao-Peng 1993).
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CONCLUSIONS
The following conclusions are mainly based on theoretical considerations, 
empirical confi rmation of which is very limited. Admittedly, the case studies 
cited are too few to provide real confi rmatory evidence. Therefore, the conclu-
sions must be regarded as tentative.
The supply of health insurance was characterized above by fi ve dimensions: 
size of benefi t package, risk selection effort, amount of loading as the net price of 
coverage, degree of vertical integration between insurers and health care provid-
ers, and market structure as indicated by degree of concentration. 
With regard to the benefi ts package, private insurers doing business in LICs 
are predicted to offer less comprehensive packages than private insurers in indus-
trialized countries. The latter are used as the competitive benchmark, although 
many industrialized countries heavily regulate health insurers or permit their 
cartelization (see tables 3A.1, 3A.2, and 3A.3). However, some factors that pro-
mote comprehensive benefi ts are attenuated in LICs. This fi nding holds to an 
even greater extent for CBI schemes.
Risk selection effort may be greater in LICs than in industrialized countries, 
because fully uniform premiums, which induce maximum effort at cream skim-
ming, are a likely choice of LIC regulators. At the same time, risk-adjustment 
mechanisms, which are designed to neutralize health insurers’ incentive to 
select favorable risks in response to regulated premiums, are too complicated to 
be implemented in many LICs. Their defi ciencies are considerable even in indus-
trialized countries (see Zweifel and Breuer 2006).
The amount of loading in health insurance premiums in LICs is expected to 
be high in comparison with the competitive benchmark, because the regulatory 
framework and the prevalence of fraud and abuse exert pressure in that direc-
tion. Because administrative expenses are lower in CBI schemes to an extent 
that regulation is unlikely to neutralize, these schemes may have a competitive 
advantage on this score.
Imposition of vertical restraints or completion of full vertical integration can 
originate with insurers or health care providers. Private health insurers in LICs 
appear to be hampered in these endeavors to an even greater extent than their 
counterparts in industrialized countries. CBI schemes may have an advantage 
here, because their behavior is less likely to hurt their reputation with health care 
providers and because they do not have to deal with provider cartels. Such a dif-
ference cannot be discerned in the case of provider-driven integration efforts; set-
tings reminiscent of managed care may therefore originate with CBI schemes.
Finally, the degree of concentration in LICs’ markets for private health insur-
ance could be higher than in industrialized countries’ markets, in large part due to 
high barriers to entry. CBI schemes should not systematically differ in this regard.
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ANNEX 3A: TYPES AND EFFICIENCY EFFECTS OF REGULATION
Individuals losing their health insurance protection may face hardship and pov-
erty that affect society as a whole. The main motives to regulate private health 
insurance are to eliminate the social costs of insolvency by preventing insolvency 
or to mitigate these social costs while accepting the possibility of insolvency 
(Zweifel and Eisen 2003, chapter 8.1). 
Regulations designed to eliminate insolvencies also seek to avoid instability in 
insurance markets that may occur due to adverse selection processes. Typically, 
these regulations are comprehensive and detailed, because current operations of 
insurers must be monitored to attain the objective. However, this type of regula-
tion generates ineffi ciency, because it prevents insurers from adopting least-cost 
solutions. Thus, regulation aimed at avoiding insolvency under all circumstances 
may not maximize social welfare. Once private insurance schemes are fully regu-
lated—for example, prices, quantity, and quality of private insurance products 
are determined outside the market mechanism—resource allocation is likely to 
deteriorate. In other words, incorrect product pricing, ineffective packages, and 
reduced competitive behavior may lead to an ineffi cient and inequitable alloca-
tion of private health insurance products. Table 3A.1 provides an overview of 
regulations that tend to lower effi ciency. For example, budget approval stifl es 
product innovation, because, apart from possible delays, the insurer runs the risk 
that the cost of innovation will not be approved.
Regulation can be designed to reduce social costs by making insurers bear 
them in the event of insolvency. Two ways to internalize these costs are to 
require the deposit of reserves or the establishment of a guaranty fund fi nanced 
jointly by the insurers (see table 3A.2). These measures mitigate the hardship of 
the insured in the event of insolvency. But these regulations also have a cost, 
because, for example, the reserves probably could have been invested at a rate of 
return higher than that earned by deposit. In addition, the regulations entail an 
administrative cost. On the whole, however, regulations aimed at internalizing 
the social costs of insolvency appear to have greater potential to enhance effi -
ciency than regulations aimed at preventing insolvency.
Finally, insurance regulation may have the objective of creating demand for 
private coverage. Such demand is viewed as a precondition for expanded provi-
sion of private health care and the reaping of effi ciency gains associated with 
such care (Griffi n 1989, 23).
Table 3A.3 presents selected countries’ health insurance regulations (identi-
fi ed by letter and number in tables 3A.1 and 3A.2).
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TABLE 3A.1  Regulations that Tend to Lower Effi ciency
Regulation Effect
A.1 Imposed premiums Provides few incentives
Undermines price competition
Premium fails to refl ect expected costs
Disturbs balance of underwriting and investing 
activities
A.2 Obligation to provide specifi c products and have other 
products approved by regulator
Restricts product competition
Does not refl ect individual benefi t-cost estimates
A.3 Rules on active/passive ownership (vertical integration) Prevents insurers from fi nding the optimal degree 
of vertical integration
A.4 Obligation to provide certain benefi ts, to ensure certain 
risks, or both
Threatens viability of insurance 
Does not refl ect individual benefi t-cost estimates
A.5 Separation of lines of business Loss of synergy effects both for insured and 
insurer (allocation of reserves is not optimal)
A.6 Budget approval Hampers product innovation 
A.7 Rules on investments May prevent insurers from obtaining maximum 
expected return for a given volatility
A.8 Subsidies and tax exemptions in favor of insurers Justifi ed if insurers provide a public good 
(e.g., cohesion of society)
Induces overconsumption of insurance
A.9 Obligation to contract with providers Lowers pressure on providers to be effi cient 
TABLE 3A.2  Regulations that Tend to Enhance Effi ciency
Regulation Effect
B.1 Licenses for insurers Lowers probability of insolvency
B.2 Minimum capital Lowers probability of fraud
B.3 Minimum liquidity requirements Lowers probability of insolvency
B.4 Reinsurance schemes Lowers probability of insolvency
B.5 Provision of a guarantee fund Lowers probability of insolvency
B.6 Industrywide insolvency fund Lowers probability of insolvency 
B.7 Provision of information to regulators and consumers Increases transparency
B.8 Agreed-on accounting procedures, internal and 
external auditing
Increases transparency
B.9 Mandatory risk-adjustment scheme among insurers in 
the presence of adverse selection
Eliminates cream skimming by insurers
Often a complement of premium regulation
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TABLE 3A.3  Health Insurance Regulation in Specifi c Countries
Regions/countries
Regulations reducing 
effi ciency
Regulations enhancing 
effi ciency Comments
OECD countries
Switzerland A.1, A.3, A.5, A.7 B.1, B.2, B.3, B.5, B.7, B.8
The Netherlands A.2, A.4, A.8, B.1, B.2, B.3, B.4, B.5, 
B.7, B.8
General: 31% of population covered 
by private health insurance
Uncertain B.6, B.9
Australia A.1, A.2, A.3, A.4, A.6, 
A.7, A.8, A.9
B.1, B.2, B.3, B.4, B.5, 
B.6, B.7, B.8, B9
General: 1/3 of population covered 
by private health insurance
United States A.1, A.2, A.3, A.4, A.5, 
A.7, A.8, A.9
B.1, B.2, B.3, B.4, B.7, B.8 General: Regulation varies greatly 
from state to state
Uncertain A.6 B.3, B.5, B.9
Canada A.2, A.3, A.4, A.8 B.1, B.2, B.6, B.7, B.8
Uncertain A.7 B.3, B.5
New Zealand B.1, B.3, B.7, B.8 B.3: $500,000 must be kept in a 
trust
General: Private health insurer 
must provide an annual annotated 
statement, otherwise business 
hardly regulated
Africa
South Africa B.1, B.2, B.8
Uncertain A.6, A.7
Zambia B.1, B.2, B.4, B.5
Uncertain A.1, A.2, A.3, A.4, A.6, 
A.7, A.8, A.9
B.3, B.6, B.7, B.8, B.9
Zimbabwe B.1, B.2, B.4, B.5, B.8
Uncertain A.1, A.2, A.3, A.4, A.5, 
A.6, A.7, A.8, A.9
B.3, B.6, B.7, B.9
Nigeria B.4 General: 0.03% of population 
covered by private health insurance
Uncertain A.2, A.3, A.4, A.5, A.6, 
A.8, A.9
B.1, B.2, B.3, B.5, B.6, 
B.7, B.8, B.9
(in July 1995)
Asia
Philippines A1 B.1, B.2, B.4, B.5, B.6, 
B.7, B.8
A.1: Premiums are taxed at 5% 
per year
General: Private health insurance 
covers 2% of population; premiums 
for poor citizens paid/subsidized 
by government’s public health 
insurance scheme
Uncertain A.4, A.6, A.8 B.3, B.9
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TABLE 3A.3  Health Insurance Regulation in Specifi c Countries
Regions/countries
Regulations reducing 
effi ciency
Regulations enhancing 
effi ciency Comments
Thailand A.3, A.7, A.8 B.1, B.2, B.3, B.4, B.5, 
B.6, B.7, B.8
General: Private health insurance 
covers 2% of population; 24% of 
population not covered by any form 
of health insurance
Uncertain  B.9
Singapore A.2, A.4, A.7, A.8 B.1, B.2, B.4, B.5, B.7, B.8 A.2: Like Eldershield
B.2: Risk-based capital 
requirements
General: Monetary Authority of 
Singapore estimates risk profi les 
for each Singapore-based health 
insurer; more critical insurers more 
stringently supervised
Uncertain A.3 B.3, B.6, B.9
Malaysia A.8 B.1, B.2, B.4, B.7, B.8
Uncertain A.6, A.7 B.3, B.5, B.6, B.9  
Indonesia A.4, A.7 B.1, B.2, B.3, B.4,B.8 General: Private health insurance 
covers 1% of population; only 14% 
of population has some form of 
insurance; private health insurance 
protection expires when individual 
reaches age 55; community-based 
primary insurance – Dana Sehat
Taiwan (China) A.1, A.2, A.3, A.4, A.5, 
A.6, A.7, A.8, A.9
B.1, B.2, B.3, B.4, B.5, 
B.7, B.8, B.9
General: Community-based 
insurance program (Farmers’ Health 
Insurance) also available
China A.1, A.2, A.4, A.6 B.1, B.8 General: 3.17% of urban and 1.41% 
of rural population covered by 
private health insurance
Uncertain A.3, A.5, A.7, A.8, A.9 B.2, B.3, B.4, B.5, B.6, 
B.7, B.9
India A.7 B.1, B.2, B.3, B.4, B.7, B.8
Uncertain A.6, A.8   
Eastern Europe
Slovenia A.2, A.3, A.4, A.5, A.7 B.1, B.2, B.4, B.5, B.6, 
B.7, B.8
Uncertain  A.6, A.8 B.9  
Kazakhstan A.4, A.7 B.1, B.4, B.6 General: Regulations differ from 
oblast (state) to oblast
Uncertain A.1, A.2, A.3, A.5, A.6, 
A.8, A.9
B.2, B.3, B.5, B.7, B.9  
(continued)
  (continued)
Turkey A.8 B.1, B.2, B.4, B.8 General: 30% of population has no 
form of insurance
Uncertain A.2, A.3, A.4, A.5, A.6, 
A.7, A.9
B.3, B.5, B.6, B.7, B.9  
Russian Federation A.2, A.4, A.7, A.8, A.9 B.1, B.4, B.8
Uncertain A.3, A.5 B.2, B.3, B.5  
Latin America
Colombia A.1, A.2, A.4, A.8 B.4, B.6 General: 1% of working-age 
population enrolled only in private 
health insurance
Uncertain A.3, A.5, A.6, A.7, A.9 B.1, B.2, B.3, B.5, B.7, B.8
Brazil A.3, A.4, A.5, A.6 B.1, B.4, B.8  
Uncertain A.8 B.2, B.3, B.5, B.6, B.9  
Chile A.1, A.2, A.4 B.1, B.4, B.8 A.1: Government determines 
compulsory premium, currently 7% 
of private income
General: Private health insurance 
covers 33% of population; among 
those aged 60+ (9.5% of population), 
this share drops to 3.2%
Costa Rica A.1, A.7 B.4, B.8 General: Public company 
monopolizes insurance market
Uncertain A.2, A.3, A.4, A.5, A.6, 
A.8, A.9
B.1, B.2, B.3, B.5, B.6, 
B.7, B.9
Argentina A.2 B.1, B.4, B.7, B.8 General: Private health insurance 
covers 9% of population
Uncertain A.6, A.7, A.8 B.2, B.3
Mexico A.7 B.1, B.4, B.5, B.6, B.7, B.8
Uncertain A.2, A.3, A.4, A.5, A.6, 
A.7, A.8, A.9
B.2, B.3, B.9
Sources: Switzerland: Socioeconomic Institute (SOI) resources. The Netherlands: Bertens and Bultman 2003; Egen 2002; 
Hamilton 2002. Australia: Bowie 2003; Industry Commission 1997; IASB 1999. United States: Egen 2002; SOI resources. Canada: 
CPSS 2003; Canada Department of Finance 2002; IASB 1999; SOI resources. New Zealand: Bowie 2003. South Africa: Mametja 
1997; Khunoane 2003; Soderlund, Schierhout, and van den Heever 1998. Zambia: WHO (World Health Organization) online 
resources. Zimbabwe: WHO online resources. Nigeria: Awosika 2003; Ogunbekun 1997; WHO online resources. Philippines: 
Akal and Harvey 2001. Thailand: Charoenparij and others 1999; Gross 1997; Insurance Journal 2003; Keeratipipatpong 2002; 
Singkaew and Chaichana 1998. Singapore: Khan 2001; Kumar 2000; Loong 2002; Ministry of Health (Philippines) 2003; Taylor 
2003; Taylor and Blair 2003. Malaysia: Malaysian Medical Association 2003; World Bank online resources; WHO online resources. 
Indonesia: Marzolf 2002; Heath Lambert Group Global online resources (www.heathlambertgroup.com /default3.asp); Hohmann, 
Lankers, and Schmidt-Ehry 2002. Taiwan (China): Bureau of National Health Insurance (Taiwan) (www.nhi.gov.tw/00english/e_
index.htm); World Bank online resources; WHO online resources. China: Liu 2002; Liu, Rao, and Hu 2002. India: Mahal 2002; India 
Infoline (www.indiainfoline.com/view/201299.html). Slovenia: Trade Point Slovenia 2002. Kazakhstan: Brinkerhoff 2002; BISNIS 
2002. Turkey: Rooney 2001; Sarp, Esatoglu, and Akbulut 2002. Russian Federation: Yegerov 2003; World Bank online resources; 
WHO online resources. Colombia: Trujillo 2002; World Bank online resources; WHO online resources. Brazil: Bardroff, Hohmann, 
and Holst 2000; World Bank online resources; WHO online resources. Chile: Barrentos and Lloyd-Sherlock 2000; Hohmann and Holst 
2002; Mahal 2002; World Bank online resources; WHO online resources. Costa Rica: Pan American Health Organization profi le of 
Costa Rica (www.paho.org/ English/SHA/prfl COR.htm); World Bank online resources; WHO online resources. Argentina: Bardroff, 
Hohmann, and Holst 2000; Barrentos and Lloyd-Sherlock 2000; World Bank online resources; WHO online resources. Mexico: World 
Bank online resources; WHO online resources.
TABLE 3A.3  Health Insurance Regulation in Specifi c Countries (continued)
Regions/countries
Regulations reducing 
effi ciency
Regulations enhancing 
effi ciency Comments
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ANNEX 3B: CORRUPTION
The extent of a government’s corruption affects a country’s health insurance 
market, because most of a health insurer’s contractual partners and partners in 
vertical restraints are domestic.
The extent of corruption can be measured in several ways. Among the more 
traditional indexes are the ones developed by Business International Corporation 
(used by Mauro 1995 and by Ades and Di Tella 1997) and Political Risk Service 
Inc. International (used by Knack and Keefer 1995 and by Tanzi and Davoodi 
1997). However, the construction of these indexes appears to involve some 
degree of arbitrariness. For instance, the Business International index assigned a 
value of 10 (indicating no corruption) to Iraq during the period 1980–83. At this 
time, the regime of Saddam Hussein, widely recognized as corrupt, had been in 
power for many years.
Here, preference is given to the Transparency International (TI) corruption 
index, which refl ects data provided by the World Economic Forum, the World 
Bank (World Business Environment Survey), the Institute of Management Devel-
opment, PricewaterhouseCoopers, the Political and Economic Risk Consultancy, 
the Economist Intelligence Unit, and Freedom House’s Nations in Transit. The 
TI corruption index is based on surveys of perception. It includes only coun-
tries for which at least three survey sources are available; each source must rank 
nations and measure the overall perceived level of corruption but must not fore-
cast changes in corruption or risks to political stability. In the index, 10 indicates 
no corruption and 0 indicates absolute corruption. Table 3B.1 presents the TI 
rankings of the countries presented in table 3A.3 in the order that the countries 
are listed in table 3A.3.
TABLE 3B.1  Transparency International Corruption Index 2003, Selected Countries
Country Corruption index Country Corruption index
Switzerland 8.8 Indonesia 1.9
The Netherlands 8.9 Taiwan (China) 5.7
Australia 8.8 China 3.4
United States 7.5 India 2.8
Canada 8.7 Slovenia 5.9
New Zealand 9.5 Kazakhstan 2.4
South Africa 4.4 Turkey 3.1
Zambia 2.5 Russian Federation 2.7
Zimbabwe 2.3 Colombia 3.7
Nigeria 1.4 Brazil 3.9
Philippines 2.5 Chile 7.4
Thailand 3.3 Costa Rica 4.3
Source: Transparency International.
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ANNEX 3C: QUALITY OF GOVERNANCE
Shareholders of an insurance company might be said to hold a call option on 
the value of the insurer’s asset portfolio; the strike price is equal to the terminal 
value of the company’s liabilities—that is, the value of the policyholders’ claims. 
When assets at the end of a period are larger than liabilities, shareholders’ wealth 
equals the difference between the two. When assets fall below the value of lia-
bilities, this wealth falls to zero rather than becoming negative as a consequence 
of the shareholders’ limited liability. The right to dispose of shares at zero rather 
than a negative price amounts to a put option in the hands of shareholders. 
Conversely, policyholders bear the loss when liabilities exceed assets. The value 
of their policy is therefore given by its stated nominal value less the put option 
they have implicitly sold to shareholders.
Shareholders can engage in risky projects because their maximum loss is 
limited and must be borne by the insured. Therefore, good governance (in the 
interest of the fi rm’s owner) would call for management to take actions that 
devalue the contingent claims held by policyholders. Limited judicial capacity 
and enforcement in LICs make this scenario realistic. According to the Organisa-
tion for Economic Co-operation and Development/World Bank roundtable on 
corporate governance (OECD 2003), “tunneling” (insiders taking the assets of 
the company for themselves) is one primary problem with corporate governance 
in developing countries. If corporate governance is lax, management can even 
move funds out of the company once policyholders have paid the premium. 
This extreme case aside, an insurance company pursuing the interest of 
shareholders is predicted to act against the interests of policyholders. However, 
informed policyholders are not willing to buy insurance coverage from such a 
company. Therefore, at a given price (loading), demand for the products of the 
company will be weak, or alternatively, the products must be sold at a discount. 
Weak demand and discounted products hurt future profi ts and thus lower the 
value of shareholders’ call option. Cummins and Sommer (1996) have found 
that companies in the United States react to volatility increases by augmenting 
reserves, presumably to restore the value of the claims held by policy owners. 
Ultimately, good governance calls for management to take feedback from the 
product market into account, but the company needs a suffi cient amount of 
information from policyholders, a condition not always satisfi ed in LICs. 
Disseminating information about the risk exposure of insurance companies 
is an important task for an LIC government that is considering an enlarged role 
for private health insurance. Absent such information, scope for management 
to siphon reserves from an insurance company is great. For example, it may 
transfer assets to individuals who are not owners of the fi rm; invest funds at 
a less-than-market return in another company (typically to the benefi t of the 
company’s majority stockholder); or shift liabilities to the insurance company, 
again at insuffi cient compensation.
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Governance issues concern public insurers as well. Lack of competition, the 
absence of monitoring through the capital market, and the presence of vested-
interest groups facilitate diversion of public resources.
NOTES
The authors are grateful for comments received from Philip Musgrove and other review-
ers who attended the Wharton Conference in March 2005 and for subsequent feedback 
received at the July 2005 meeting of the International Health Economics Association.
1. Under certain circumstances the incentives for prevention are higher when coverage 
increases. V responds positively to an increase in I when the insured earns a high wage, 
is risk averse, or enjoys generous sick leave. This situation can be common in devel-
oped countries (Zweifel and Manning 2000, 417).
2. See Preker, Harding, and Travis 2000.
3. See, for example, the merger between Afrox Healthcare Limited and Amalgamated Hos-
pital Limited (South African Competition Tribunal 2001).
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